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In early 2014, Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced the worst civil unrest it had seen since the 1992 - 1995 
war as a wave of protest, called by media commentators ‘the Bosnian Spring’, shook the fragile country. The 
initially fierce and violent protests soon took a more institutionalized form as the protesters began forming 
plena, or citizens’ assemblies, and articulating their demands through the means of direct democracy. This 
research seeks to give a comprehensive understanding of how the country had come to such state that its 
people were willing to raise up on the barricades that year. This is done by utilizing the perspective of criti-
cism of liberal peacebuilding – a top-down led peacebuilding strategy applied in BiH. The failures of liberal 
peacebuilding are juxtaposed with a thorough analysis of the protest movement: who did they seek to repre-
sent, what was the object of their resistance and how did they undertake their resistance? To answer these 
questions, a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of documentation produced by the protesters, such as lists of 
demands, declarations, statements and meeting reports, is carried out. 
The findings of the research point out that the Bosnian Spring protest movement can be described as partly 
a workers’ movement, building on the socialist-era tradition, and partly a populist or civic movement, claiming 
legitimacy also beyond the working class. The asymmetric power relations between the protesters and the 
political establishment served as a key factor for defining the collective identity of the movement. Attempting 
to escape domination by political parties, elites and governments, the movement constructed its proclaimed 
apolitical identity based on the people-versus-elite dichotomy. Manipulation by the establishment, years of 
experienced neglect and wrongdoings and common calls for solidarity between the plena served to strength-
en the collective identity. The movement focused its resistance particularly on political parties, elites and 
governments, administrative and political inertia and neoliberalism. Calling for social justice, the movement’s 
most common demands included taking away unjustified financial benefits from political party and govern-
ment representatives and redistributing them to the society, replacing current governments with politically 
unaffiliated expert governments, reversing the failed post-war privatization processes and ending the impuni-
ty of repressive state-authorities and those benefiting illegally from the privatizations. 
The research pieces together a portrait of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has been 
characterized by stagnation, grey economy, corruption, clientelism, economic exploitation, a pronounced role 
of predatory elites and a dependency on a long-living international presence. While the poorly performing 
ethno-nationalist parties have dominated the legislatures, their success in repeatedly winning their seats has 
been contrasted by an overwhelming distrust towards them, prevalent among average Bosnians. At the 
same time, the importance of basic socio-economic issues for the everyday lives of Bosnians has been over-
looked parallel to a disproportionate emphasis of inter-ethnic distrust. The Bosnian Spring protests fit this 
narrative expectedly, as the protesters’ criticism of the status quo of ethno-nationalist parties and elites sent 
out a message that hunger weights more than political fault lines. The links between the failures of liberal 
peacebuilding and the witnessed resistance are deemed evident as at the root of the protesters’ criticism 
were the same issues that liberal peacebuilding seeks to achieve: democracy, rule of law, civil society, hu-
man rights and economic liberalization. It is argued that the space for civil society actors to influence societal 
developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to act to bring upon positive change is highly restricted due to 
the domination and manipulation by the political elites. 
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1. Introduction 
On 4 February 2014, outraged factory workers marched out to the streets of the industrial city of 
Tuzla in Bosnia and Herzegovina1. Questionable privatizations, asset-stripping, bankruptcy and un-
employment – the story they had to tell was something that had been commonly heard in post-
socialist transition economies alike. While initially the workers’ protest was peaceful, the events 
soon took a violent turn, as in the following days the country experienced the worst civil unrest it 
had seen since the war of 1992 - 1995. In hundreds, the protesters clashed violently with the law 
enforcement, torched government buildings and destroyed other property. The protests soon spread 
to other cities, particularly in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). After a quick and 
fierce beginning, the protests took a more institutionalized form as the protesters began forming 
plena, or citizens’ assemblies, and started to articulate their demands through the means of direct 
democracy. Issues raised such as corruption, inequality, poor social welfare, high unemployment 
and bloated government salaries and benefits suggested that the nearly twenty-year, internationally 
led peacebuilding and statebuilding intervention in BiH had not managed to answer to the citizens’ 
needs and expectations. 
The protests, called by media commentators ‘the Bosnian Spring’, ultimately faded out as fast as 
they had begun – not living up to the nickname inspired by the Arab Spring (See BBC 2014b; New 
York Times 2014). However, two crucial questions were left behind: what do the protests tell about 
the current state of affairs in Bosnia and could similar civil unrest happen again? As a response to 
these questions, the purpose of this research is to give a comprehensive understanding of how the 
country had come to such being that its people were willing to raise up on the barricades that year. 
This will be done by utilizing the perspective of criticism of liberal peacebuilding – a top-down led 
peacebuilding strategy applied in BiH. The failures of liberal peacebuilding will be juxtaposed with 
a thorough analysis of the protest movement, particularly emphasizing the plena: who did they seek 
to represent, what was the object of their resistance and how did they undertake their resistance? To 
answer these questions, a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of documentation produced by the 
protesters, such as lists of demands, declarations, statements and meeting reports, compiled on a 
blog titled Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files, will be carried out. Ultimately, the research will cul-
minate into answering the following research question, which links the findings of the research with 
the chosen theoretical stance: 
                                                          
1 Here on referred to also as “Bosnia” or “BiH”. 
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How is the resistance manifested in the Bosnian Spring protests connected to the failures of 
liberal peacebuilding seen during the peace process of Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
While the protests have raised the interest of a number of researchers, none of the previous research 
approach the subject from the perspective of Peace and Conflict Research (PCR), specifically 
through the lens of criticism of liberal peacebuilding. Some of the previous research have assumed 
an anthropological or a human geography perspective (See Kurtović 2015; Kurtović & Hromadzic 
2017; Riding 2016). More politically-oriented research has focused, for instance, on democracy and 
consociationalism, ethnic politics, civil society movements and EU-integration (See Sejfija & Fink-
Hafner 2016; Murtagh 2016; Stefanovski 2017; Majstorović, Pepić and Vučkovac 2015). This re-
search connects more with previous research which has focused on Bosnia from the perspective of 
International Political Economy (IPE) but lacked the protests as the subject (See Bojicic-Dzelilovic 
2009; Divjak & Pugh 2008; Donais 2002; Pugh 2002). As Kurtović (2015, 641) notes, this type of 
research focusing on economic reforms and their consequences in the context of BiH has not been 
highly prioritized or too common. Hence, this research will add a new and complementary perspec-
tive to the currently available literature on the Bosnian Spring protests.  
More generally, BiH has often been mentioned as a case in point in research related to criticism of 
liberal peacebuilding (See Richmond 2014; Richmond & Franks 2009; Kappler & Richmond 2014). 
However, the so-called ‘local-turn’ or hybridity theorists have mostly adopted a different view on 
one of the central concepts of this research: resistance. Their understanding of resistance has been 
criticized of ignoring the central importance of power relations, creating a blurry account of agency 
and ultimately reifying binaries and depoliticizing the local (See Nadarajah & Rampton 2015; 
Chandler 2013; Iñiguez de Heredia 2017). This research will adopt a more pragmatic understanding 
of resistance, not seeing the concept in the context of hybridity or as a way towards hybrid peace 
but rather as potentially having roots in the outcomes or failures of the liberal peace project. As 
Iñiguez de Heredia notes, after all, resistance is not typically aimed at the liberal nature of the inter-
ventions nor their externally imposed nature but rather the recreation of an extractive and coercive 
order through the reconstitution of state authority or the means of war (Iñiguez de Heredia 2017, 3). 
In this manner, this research will join the vast literature on criticism of liberal peacebuilding, how-
ever, bringing with it an updated and fresh take on resistance and a comprehensive and multidisci-
plinary perspective to understanding the Bosnian peace process. 
The field of actors and their interests, the political system as well as the history of BiH are unargua-
bly complex. For this reason, Chapter 2 will focus on contextualizing the research and giving the 
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reader a required understanding of these aspects. The chapter will begin with a summary of the 
events of the Bosnian War of 1992 – 1995 and the end of the conflict, namely the General Frame-
work Agreement for Peace, also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). After that, a brief 
outline of the post-conflict peacebuilding process and the political and socio-economic development 
of the country until 2014 will be given. The description of the Bosnian War and the post-conflict 
developments are by no means intended to be an all-encompassing and comprehensive history. Ra-
ther, they will highlight the main points required for understanding the progress of the Bosnian 
peace process and the following discussions. The last part of the chapter will be dedicated to the 
events of the Bosnia Spring protests, as a wider examination of previous research on the topic will 
be conducted and the events introduced accordingly.   
Chapter 3 will outline the theoretical foundations of the research, beginning with defining the con-
cept of liberal peace, the agency behind it and its roots in the UN-led peace operations of the 1990s. 
The constituent parts of the Western and top-down-led approach to peacebuilding and statebuilding 
have traditionally been democracy, rule of law, civil society and market economics or economic 
liberalization in the form of development and free-market reform (Richmond & Franks 2009, 3; 
Campbell, Chandler & Shabaratnam 2011, 1). However, as noted by the so-called ‘local-turn’ crit-
ics or hybridity theorists, there has been a disconnection between liberal peacebuilding and its sub-
jects, reflecting negatively on the legitimacy, efficiency, local ownership, inclusivity and emancipa-
tory nature of the peacebuilding efforts. These core points of criticism will be derived from research 
literature, as the critical turn is introduced.  
As Bosnia has, indeed, served as an experiment or ‘prototype’ for peacebuilding and thus is a rather 
unique case, Chapter 4 will dig deeper into the criticism of liberal peacebuilding specifically in the 
context of the country (See Chandler 2000). The lack of efficiency, local-ownership, inclusion and 
legitimacy will be approached through examining the often too unquestioned concept of ‘ethnicity’, 
the political dynamics and the role of the ethno-nationalist elites in BiH. The difficulties encoun-
tered with regard to economic emancipation in BiH as a result of the neoliberal reform agenda will 
be discussed in-depth in the second part of Chapter 4. The transition from the unique Yugoslav 
brand of market socialism towards the free-market ideals of liberal peace was a precarious one, par-
ticularly evident in the birth of powerful patronage networks, corruption, stagnation, grey economy 
and the critical post-war privatization failures. 
Due contextualization will serve to make meaningful also Chapter 5, which will focus on resistance 
emanating from everyday necessities. The concept of resistance serves as a bridge between the the-
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oretical framework and the Bosnian Spring protests. However, the approach of the local-turn critics 
or hybridity theorists towards the concept will not be assumed, as the chapter will introduce a meta-
level of criticism towards their position. Rather than depoliticizing resistance through reducing it to 
a means towards hybrid peace, this research will acknowledge the asymmetric power relations be-
hind resistance and seek to provide a more accurate and concrete depiction of it. The assumed defi-
nition of resistance will also flow naturally into the adopted methodological approach of CDA. In 
the other half of the chapter, CDA, as understood and shaped by Norman Fairclough, will be intro-
duced (See Fairclough & Fairclough 2012; Fairclough 2010; Fairclough 1992; Fairclough 1989). 
The approach will include analysis of discourse practices, texts and social practice that the dis-
courses are part of. Before moving to the analysis, the research material and the research question 
will also be described and defined further.  
In Chapter 6, the findings from the analysis will show that the 2014 protest movement can be de-
scribed as partly a workers’ movement, building on the socialist-era tradition, and partly a populist 
or civic movement, claiming legitimacy also beyond the working class. The movement constructed 
its proclaimed apolitical identity on the people-versus-elite dichotomy, positioning itself against the 
political establishment – that is, the political parties, elites and governments. Risk of manipulation 
by the establishment, years of experienced neglect and calls for common solidarity between differ-
ent groups of protesters served to strengthen the collective identity. The movement focused its re-
sistance particularly on political parties, elites and governments, administrative and political inertia 
and neoliberalism. The employed means of resistance included various physical means, but they 
more notably focused on setting collectively approved demands through the plena – most of all, fo-
cusing on social justice. In addition to various localized demands, the recurring and most common 
demands included taking away unjustified financial benefits from political party and government 
representatives and redistributing them to the society, replacing political governments with politi-
cally unaffiliated expert governments, reversing the failed privatization processes and ending the 
impunity of those illegally benefitting from them as well as state authorities guilty of violations 
against the protesters. 
The findings will be brought together in a synthesis and a discussion of the results will follow in 
Chapter 7. The broad conclusion will be presented that the connections between the proclaimed ide-
als – and the eventual failures – of liberal peacebuilding and the identified discourse practices are 
evident. At the root of the protesters’ criticism were the same issues that liberal peacebuilding seeks 
to achieve: democracy, rule of law, civil society and human rights and economic liberalization. 
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These connections will be disaggregated further in the chapter. At the same time, the results high-
light the overpowering role of the ethno-nationalist parties and political elites in BiH. It is suggested 
that the success of similar civic movements that seek wide scale support and solidarity across ethno-
national lines in BiH is conditioned on them being able to escape this domination and evade the risk 
of political manipulation and framing. Accordingly, the space for civil society actors to influence 
societal developments in the country and to act to bring upon positive change is highly restricted. In 
a more general sense, the results highlight a link between socio-economic factors and political in-
stability, pointing out to interesting directions for further analysis. In the end, final conclusions will 
be drawn in Chapter 8. 
 
 
  
  
6 
 
2. Background and Previous Research 
2.1. The Bosnian War 1992 - 1995 
The characteristically multicultural country of Bosnia and Herzegovina served as a stage for a de-
structive conflict in 1992 - 1995, which left over 100 000 dead and around two million displaced, 
seeing carefully orchestrated policies of ethnic “cleansing”2 and genocide3 (See Bennett 2016, 68-
69; Pasic 2015, 79). The Bosnian war took place amid the wider context of the dissolution of Yugo-
slavia, where the nomenklatura society, controlled by the Communist Party through authoritative 
mechanisms for economic and social control and a comprehensive security apparatus, started with-
ering first economically before igniting into a full political crisis (Bennett 2016, 33). The crisis was 
fuelled by ethno-nationalist politics, championed by the president of Serbia’s League of Com-
munists, Slobodan Milošević. As a destabilizing wave moving through Serbia, Vojvodina, Monte-
negro and Kosovo, Milošević consolidated his grip over the Yugoslav state apparatus and power 
among ethnic Serbs. Secessionist tendencies arose as a result in the other Yugoslav republics, cul-
minating in the year 1991, when Macedonia declared independence peacefully, a ten-day war was 
fought in Slovenia and a bloodier war broke out in Croatia. While the question of international 
recognition was easily answered in these cases by the Badinter Commission, or an arbitration com-
mittee established by the mediating European Community (EC), the “Bosnia question”4 turned out 
harder to solve (Bennett 2016, 15, 53-54, 59-60). 
In the following year, pressure mounted on Bosnia, where the large ethno-nationalist parties took 
different positions towards sovereignty. The Bosniak or Muslim SDA (Party of Democratic Ac-
tion), led by the president Alija Izetbegović, was positive towards the Slovenian and Croatian advo-
cacy of confederalism in Yugoslavia and wished to exit the Serb-dominated remnants of the state. 
HDZ (Croat Democratic Union), as a branch of the ruling party led by Franjo Tuđman in Croatia, 
had a more complex position and supported a sovereign Bosnia, but demanded self-determination 
for Bosnian Croats. The only party wishing to stay within Yugoslavia and with Serbia was SDS 
(Serb Democratic Party), founded and led by Radovan Karadžić, who also insisted self-
                                                          
2 This research acknowledges the dark and euphemistic nature of this commonly used term, which hides behind it the 
reality of forced displacement, intimidation, mass killings and sexual and gender-based violence. 
3 Criminal acts committed in Srebrenica 1995 were established as constituting inter alia the crime of genocide by the 
International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for the first time in the Krstić case in 1998 (see ICTY 
2018; ICTY 1999). 
4 “[H]ow some 2.2. million Bosniaks can live amid 4.5. million Croats and 8.5 million Serbs in the former Yugoslavia; 
and how some 750 000 Croats and 1.3 million Serbs can live together with 1.9. million Bosniaks within Bosnia itself” 
(Bennett 2016, 15). 
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determination for Bosnian Serbs in case other scenarios were to take place. To solve the question, a 
EC-supported referendum took place on 29 February and 1 March 1992, showing overwhelming 
support for independence while being boycotted by SDS and the Bosnian Serbs. However, before 
the final results of the referendum had managed to come in, the first shots were fired, and Bosnia 
spiralled slowly into war. (Bennett 2016, 40-43, 63-64.) 
Notwithstanding attempts to reach an agreement between the Bosnian Muslim, Serb and Croat lead-
ers in Lisbon (“Cutileiro Plan”)5, shortly after independence was declared, Serbian and Croatian 
paramilitaries began attempting to annex parts of Bosnian territory. Remnants of the Yugoslav Na-
tional Army (JNA) and republic-based territorial defence units became the Army of Republika 
Srpska (VRS), closely affiliated with the parent organization and backed by Serbia. Launching an 
ethnic cleansing campaign, the Serb army advanced quickly, soon controlling almost 70% of Bosni-
an territory. Croatian forces who fought under the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) also began 
ethnic cleansing early in the conflict in 1992. While originally fighting together with Bosniaks, 
Croatian forces abandoned their alliance with them and started to grab land in 1993. Nationalists in 
south of Bosnia, led by visions of Croat leader Mate Boban, exhibited their separatist ambitions by 
establishing the proto-state of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosna. The Bosnian army, on the 
other hand, was organized only two weeks into the war and faced difficulties in acquiring arms – its 
disarray was visible, for instance, in the besieged city of Sarajevo, which was at one point protected 
by a criminal group led by gangsters known as Caco and Celo, and in Tuzla and Bihać, where 
workers, mobilized as soldiers, fought under Bosniak Patriotic Leagues, acquiring their resources 
from “taxation” of humanitarian aid and local taxes. (Bennett 2016, 65, 69; Friedman 2004, 41-45; 
New York Times 1993.) 
The bigger picture of the war was complex: according to a UN Security Council report from 1994, 
there may have been at least 83 paramilitary groups operating in Bosnia – 56 supporting rump Yu-
goslavia and the self-declared Republika Srpska (RS), 14 in support of BiH and 13 supporting 
Croatia (United Nations 1994). Moreover, the largest armies of the three factions occasionally in-
cluded soldiers from the other ethnic groups as well (Bennett 2016, 68). All of the parties had blood 
on their hands: war crimes were committed by all of the warring factions and the 161 ICTY indict-
ees, out of which 124 related to events in Bosnia, included the leadership of Serbia, Bosnian Serbs, 
Bosnian Croats, Croatian Serbs as well as individuals in the Croatian military and multiple Bosnian 
government military leaders (Bennett 2016, 133; Rosand 1998, 1092, 1099-1100). The single worst 
                                                          
5 The plan was rejected by HDZ and the Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban as well as the Bosnian government and Pres-
ident Izetbegović (Bennett 2016, 65; Friedman 2004, 43). 
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atrocity of the Wars of Yugoslav Dissolution happened near the end of the Bosnian conflict in the 
UN-declared “safe area” of Srebrenica, where 7000-8000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were mas-
sacred between 11 and 18 July 1995 by various paramilitary units and VRS forces which were op-
erating under the command of Ratko Mladić and Radislav Krstić (Bennett 2016, 74; Kerr 2006; IC-
TY 2018; ICTY 1999). 
The road towards peace was paved with continued atrocities against civilians, a promising peace 
plan (“Vance-Owen Plan”) turned down by the Republika Srpska National Assembly, a successful 
agreement to end the Croat-Muslim War in 1994 (“Washington Agreement”), repeated humiliations 
for the UN peacekeepers at the hand of the Bosnian Serbs and ultimately two massacres at the 
Markale market in the besieged Sarajevo that eventually led to a decisive NATO air campaign, 
which shifted the power balance away from the Bosnian Serbs. In the end, the Croatian army recap-
tured the Serb-held territory of Republika Srpska Krajina in Croatia, leading to the displacement of 
150 000 to 200 000 Serb civilians, and HVO and the Bosnian Army went for one last advance in 
Western Bosnia before, on 10 October 1995, the thirty-fifth and last ceasefire of the conflict went 
into effect, and the negotiations could begin. (Bennett 2016, 70-76.) 
 
2.2. End of the Violence – End of the Conflict? 
The Bosnian War officially ended in the US-driven 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace, 
also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement. The agreement was made between the Bosniak leader 
Alija Izetbegović, his Foreign Minister Muhamed Šaćirbeg and Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić, and 
presidents Franjo Tuđman of Croatia and Slobodan Milošević of Serbia who represented Bosnian 
Serbs and Bosnian Croats respectively in the negotiations. The mediation process was initiated by 
the United States, with diplomat Richard Holbrooke acting as the chief negotiator and leading a ne-
gotiating team. The negotiations included also co-chairs of EU Special Representative Carl Bildt 
and First Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, Igor Ivanov, as well as other representatives from the 
UK and US, witnessing the agreement. Notably, the Bosnian Serb-leader Radovan Karadžić and 
General Ratko Mladić were excluded from the negotiations on basis of their 1995 indictments by 
the International War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague on charges of genocide, relating inter alia to 
Srebrenica. (Donais 2005, 8-9; Paczulla 2004, 264.) 
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The DPA represented a typical power-brokering and consociationalist approach, which was led in a 
top-down manner, exclusively between state (and international organization) parties with external 
powers influencing the process greatly. The agreement mandated a wide range of international or-
ganizations, such as NATO, OSCE, UNHCR as well as the newly established Office of the High 
Representative (OHR), to take over the implementation of different areas of responsibility. The 
agreement begins with a short declarative part, which is followed by multiple annexes concerning 
military aspects, regional stabilization, borders, elections, arbitration, human rights, refugees and 
IDPs, national monuments, public corporations, civilian implementation, international police task 
force and, importantly, the constitution of BiH. (See General Framework Agreement for Peace 
1995.) The latter, Annex IV of the DPA, has been considered as problematic, as its preamble ce-
ments and gives an official legitimization to the ethnic division among the three ‘constitutive peo-
ples’ of Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks, or Bosnian Muslims. This ethnic divide re-
flects widely in the Bosnian state structure and political system as they are today. While the three 
largest ethnic groups of Bosnia carry their own distinctive religious identity – Bosniaks are mostly 
Muslim, Croats Catholic, and Serbs Orthodox Christian – the country is also home to groups that do 
not fall under this ethnic or religious categorization, such as Jews, Roma, Albanians, Ukrainians and 
those who choose to identify rather as ‘Bosnians’.6 
People who do not belong to the constitutive peoples of Bosnia, including those with a diverse eth-
nic background, experience discrimination with regards to their political rights, as they have re-
stricted access to governmental jobs (Lalić & Francuz 2016, 163). The ethnic divide reflects also in 
the political life of post-Dayton BiH where three powerful pre-war ethno-nationalist parties (SDA, 
SDS and HDZ) that represent each of the constituent peoples have retained an influential position, 
and an abundance of new ethno-nationalist alternatives have emerged since: for instance, SNSD, 
SBB BiH, DNS, HDZ 1990, A-SDA, BPS, NDP and PDP (Pugh & Cobble 2001, 45-46; Lippman 
2015, 36-37). The problematic heritage left by the Annex IV of the DPA has raised attention partic-
ularly through the Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina case of the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) from 2009. In this significant precedent it was ruled that 
the ineligibility of two applicants, of Roma and Jewish origin, to stand for elections to the House of 
Peoples and the Presidency of BiH was in violation to the European Convention on Human Rights 
and thus discriminatory in its nature (See Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009). To the 
present, the Constitution of BiH has not been amended in line with the ECtHR ruling, causing diffi-
                                                          
6 For further discussion on identity, memory and forced displacement in post-Dayton BiH, See Halilovich 2013. 
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culties particularly with regard to the EU integration process of BiH (See Majstorović et al. 2015, 
662).7 
 
Fig. 1 Political System of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Domin 2001). 
Based on the DPA’s heritage, the BiH political system is highly decentralized. Bosnia has multiple 
levels of governance: 1) the central state level; 2) entity-level comprising of the administrative enti-
ties of Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), along with 
the self-governing administrative unit of Brčko District; 3) cantons in the FBiH; 4) municipalities in 
both entities (See Fig. 1). While the structure is, indeed, complex and includes a high number of 
ministers and parliamentarians, it is by no means unique as similar and even more complex systems 
can be found elsewhere in Europe (See ESI 2017, 12-14). The central state level can be considered 
as weak, as more power lies at the entity or cantonal level. The most notable difference between the 
two entities of BiH is the existence of cantons in FBiH, which represent a second level of federal-
ism. They carry significant authority over the powers, revenues and activities of municipalities and 
are responsible for health care, culture, education, social services, executive offices, courts and pub-
lic administration. On the other hand, the structure of RS is more centralized, with no similar inter-
mediate level existing. In RS, the entity level administration is responsible for performing the tasks 
that cantons carry out in FBiH. (Jokay 2001, 97-98, 113-114.) Following the ethnic division set in 
                                                          
7 Similar judgements related to discrimination, namely Zornić v. BiH (2016) and Pilav v. BiH (2014), have since been 
delivered by the ECtHR chamber. 
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place in the preamble of Annex IV of the DPA, ethnic quotas exist in the tripartite rotating presi-
dency as well as state and entity-level governments. 
Critics of the DPA argue that the agreement only transformed war into politics, creating an ethno-
nationalist stalemate (Richmond & Franks 2009, 62). This research emphasises and follows the in-
terpretation that the Dayton Agreement did not end, but rather transformed the conflict into a non-
violent one – this notion is backed by different scholars describing the post-Dayton state of BiH as a 
frozen conflict (See Perry 2009; Aggestam & Björkdahl 2012). In their examination of BiH as a 
country in a state of frozen conflict Aggestam and Björkdahl (2012, 26) define a frozen conflict as 
“a conflict in which direct and immediate physical violence may have decreased, yet the root causes 
of the dispute and the underlying interests of the conflicting parties have neither been addressed nor 
abated”. Rather than a static situation, they argue that a frozen conflict includes continued negotia-
tion, revisions of peace accords and incremental reforms, which prevent the conflict from escalat-
ing. Perry (2009, 42), on the other hand, states that the DPA ended the Bosnian war, freezing the 
warring parties to their territories and requiring that they develop a democratic system of govern-
ance together.8 This led to a period characterized by contradictions between the imperatives of 
peace implementation and the ideals of democracy as well as the interests of the elites and the peo-
ple. 
 
2.3. Twenty Years Onward from Dayton 
2.3.1 International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Soon after the DPA was successfully negotiated, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) was 
formed to guide the implementation of the agreement. The PIC consists of 55 member countries and 
agencies who assist financially, directly run operations in Bosnia or provide troops for the country’s 
peacekeeping mission (OHR 2015). The future direction for Bosnia was set in the first conference 
of the PIC in London on 8-9 December 1995, where it was decided that rule of law and democracy 
would be the basis for a new political and constitutional arrangement; a climate of security and sta-
bility would be created; human rights and the early return of refugees and displaced persons would 
be promoted and protected; an open, free-market economy would be established; economic recon-
struction would be kickstarted; and a close relationship between Bosnia and the EU built (Bennett 
                                                          
8 Discussing the victory of the nationalist parties in the first elections after the war in 1996, Søberg (2006, 49) states: 
“Those who had fought to break up the country would now be tasked with integrating it”. 
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2016, 92). Stemming from the DPA, peacebuilding in Bosnia was divided between two comple-
mentary aspects: a civilian side overseen by the OHR and a military mission originally led by 
NATO, whose responsibilities have since been transitioned to the EU (Durzun-Ozkanca 2010, 439, 
443). 
The international community in Bosnia is far from coherent, yet it revolves particularly around the 
agendas of UN, EU, OHR, OSCE, World Bank and other donors (Richmond & Franks 2009, 65). 
However, the UN’s role was diminished in the early years of the peace process and in the DPA 
since it was perceived to have failed during the war to prevent atrocities from taking place in Bosnia 
(Bennett 2016, 92). In addition to the international community, hundreds of NGOs with different 
and often uncoordinated agendas also operate in the country. Regionally, Bosnia is heavily affected 
by Croatia and Serbia, as well as the influence of Russia, the US and actors from the Islamic world. 
(Richmond & Franks 2009, 65.) The latter include particularly Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and other 
Gulf-states. Many of these actors have counterproductive aims, and they occasionally position 
themselves behind specific actors: for instance, Russia and Serbia have instigated the secession 
plans and threats by Republika Srpska; Croatia has supported the Bosnian Croats in their attempts 
to gain more autonomy; Islamic countries have contended in supporting different Bosniak commu-
nities and investing into Bosniak-majority areas; and the EU has strived to keep an integration in-
centive for Bosnia on the negotiation table. 
 
2.3.2 Political and Socio-Economic Developments 
According to Bennett (2016, 93, 96), lack of international financial support was not a problem in 
the early reconstruction process. On the contrary, the PIC as well as the European Commission and 
World Bank had managed to mobilize a high level of international aid to alleviate the country’s dire 
condition. However, political challenges and the continuing significance of wartime divisions were 
clearly problematic from the start: 
Reality in Bosnia at the end of the war was three ethno-national mini-states, each with its own 
armed forces, police, media, administration, official documentation and vehicle license plates. 
Separate currencies circulated in each ethno-national mini-state [...]. There were no tele-
phone lines between the entities, let alone bus routes, postal services or other means of com-
munication. (Bennett 2016, 93, 96.) 
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Describing the divisions as “three separate politico-economic units”, Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2009, 206) 
adds to the list restricted movement of people and goods and a lack of engagement in formal eco-
nomic cooperation. She notes that informal and illicit economy thrived in the post-war situation. It 
involved a range of actors, such as paramilitaries, high-ranking politicians, state apparatus mem-
bers, criminals as well as citizens trying to survive. This three-way divide was – and to this day has 
been – reflective of the conflict fault lines which have been kept at their place by the DPA (See 
Richmond & Franks 2009, 62; Perry 2009; Aggestam & Björkdahl 2012). Its longevity has been 
ensured by the incompatible aims of the opposing ethno-nationalist groups and their statebuilding 
trajectories: according to Keränen (2013, 356-357), Bosniaks have aimed for a strong central state 
authority, Bosnian Serbs have resisted the centralization attempts and sought to protect the autono-
my of the RS entity, and Bosnian Croats have felt ignored by the current solution, at times calling 
for the creation of a third entity for Croats. 
In the ten-year period after the war, implementation of the DPA was dragging and most of the major 
advances to create a functioning state were imposed by the international community. Nationalist 
parties used their economic and political leverage to prevent return of refugees and IDPs, counter 
economic reform and to hinder the functioning of the country’s central institutions and democratic 
development. (Donais 2005, 9-10.) A constraint for development of democracy was the extremely 
low level of respect for the political process and politicians, who were seen as self-serving figures. 
Distrust in the political process decreased citizens’ active participation in it. (Søberg 2006, 52-53.) 
The 1996-2006 period was characterized by wide-ranging and intensive international involvement 
in almost all aspects of political and economic life. This meant that the international community 
was involved in, for instance, supervising the local police, running elections, peacekeeping, taking 
part in the judiciary and managing the re-settlement and care of refugees. Foreign aid agencies were 
actively involved in the reconstruction process and administration reform, and the OHR exercised 
powers which are normally associated with the state.9 (Majstorović et al. 2015, 664.) 
Similar challenges that were faced in the first ten years persisted in the 2006 to 2014 period as well. 
Both periods saw widespread political passivity and extensive impoverishment caused by economic 
restructuring.10 However, the period from 2006 to 2014 was also characterized by a reduction in 
international involvement and a more diminished role of the OHR, as the international community 
                                                          
9 The OHR carries so-called Bonn Powers, which allow it to impose legislative solutions and dismiss public officials. In 
the first ten-year period their use was more active, but more recently they have been rendered unusable due to political 
reasons. The latest use of Bonn Powers was in 2011, when the OHR suspended certain decisions made by the BiH Cen-
tral Election Committee (See OHR 2011). 
10 Economic restructuring will be discussed below in Chapter 4. 
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assumed a more indirect strategy to influence the country through EU conditionality. (Majstorović 
et al. 2015, 664.) Hence, in the latter period, accession to the EU functioned as an incentive for in-
troducing political or economic reforms – the option has been multiple times on and off the table, 
culminating in the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2008 (See 
Causevic & Zupcevic 2009; Džihić & Wieser 2011). Parallel to the change in the international strat-
egy, the power of ethno-nationalist parties only increased, and their rhetoric became sharper 
(Majstorović et al. 2015, 664). The latter was evident, for instance, in the repeated calls of the RS 
Prime Minister Milorad Dodik – a previously pro-Western politician turned Serb-nationalist – for 
an independence referendum in RS.11 
The war had a huge impact on Bosnia’s economy. To begin with, the physical devastation left by 
the war was enormous: 500 000 of the country’s 1 295 000 housing units were subject to either par-
tial or total destruction, with more damage being seen in the FBiH-entity (Kondylis 2010, 238). The 
war caused the country’s Gross National Product (GNP) to decline down to 10 per cent and per cap-
ita income to 25 per cent of their pre-war size. Also, more than 70 per cent of Bosnia’s industrial 
plants were destroyed. (Søberg 2006, 50.) This had a particularly striking effect on the country’s 
economy since in the pre-war era its industrial core represented almost half of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and employment (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009, 205). In total, the Foreign Trade Cham-
ber of BiH estimated that the wartime damage to personal and business assets ranged from 30 to 50 
billion USD (Causevic & Zupcevic, 2009, 13). However, the difficulty of the socio-economic situa-
tion was not the only issue: Søberg (2006, 50) notes that, as with many other post-communist tran-
sitions, there was a gap between the actual political and economic results and the public’s expecta-
tions of progress and prosperity. 
                                                          
11 Since then, Milorad Dodik has served as the President of the RS and is currently in 2019 serving as the Serb-member 
of the BiH Presidency. 
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Fig. 2. GDP comparison based on World Bank (2018) World Development Indicators. 
Compared to its neighbouring countries, the Bosnian economy followed a similar development in 
terms of GDP in the post-war years, yet it remained greatly below Croatia and Serbia. From 1995 
until the global economic crisis of 2008, Bosnia’s GDP raised promisingly from USD 1,87 billion 
to USD 19,11 billion. However, since 2008 the trend has been stagnating. (See Fig. 2.) Develop-
ment has not treated different areas within BiH equally: what is often left ignored in socio-
economic analysis of Bosnia are the huge disparities between different cantons and regions. For ex-
ample, FBiH’s ten cantons vary notably in their size and wealth, and there is clear disparity between 
the canton of the capital Sarajevo and other cantons, which is visible in per capita expenditure. (ESI 
2017, 21-23.) Hence, issues such as unemployment and poverty have also been experienced to dif-
ferent extents in urban and rural areas. 
By the end of the war, majority of Bosnia’s population were dependent on humanitarian assistance, 
as wages and pensions were unpaid, and the social safety system had collapsed. Moreover, half of 
the country’s workforce were unemployed. (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009, 205.) In post-war BiH, dis-
placement affected access to employment: Kondylis (2010, 235) has argued that displaced Bosnians 
were less likely to become employed than people who stayed, with displaced men experiencing 
more unemployment and displaced women being more likely to drop out of the labour force. The 
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growth experienced until the 2008 economic crisis coincided with a reduction of poverty, as poverty 
was down to 17 percent in 2007.12 Since then both the economy and poverty reduction have stag-
nated, and in 2011 almost half of BiH citizens were deemed at risk of social exclusion or poverty – 
more than anywhere else in Europe, except Bulgaria. Also, the effect of poverty ranges differently 
between cantons, entities and areas: RS has shown to suffer more from poverty and inequality than 
FBiH, and a rural dweller has been twice as likely to be poor compared to those living in urban are-
as. (Bisogno & Chong 2002, 70; Cojocaru & Davies 2015; Ceriani & Ruggeri Laderchi 2011, 16.) 
 
Fig. 3. Unemployment rate based on ILO (2018) data collected through Labour Market Surveys. 
The unemployment rate of Bosnia stayed high persistently throughout the period of 2006-2014.13 
Moreover, gender-disaggregated data (Fig. 3) shows that female unemployment has been particular-
ly high. The data does not, however, capture the effect of informal economy or grey economy, 
which alleviates the problem of unemployment (See Divjak & Pugh 2008; Pugh 2002).14 Addition-
ally, it should be noted that there has been a serious discrepancy between the registered unemploy-
ment rate and the unemployment rate as it has been defined by the International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO): the number of registered unemployed persons has been almost twice as large as the ac-
                                                          
12 Poverty threshold calculated on the basis of the cost of life essentials such as fuel for heating and cooking, transport 
costs and basic healthcare, as well as the minimum calorie requirement (Cojocaru & Davies, 2015). 
13 Earlier ILO data is not available. 
14 The issue of informal economy or grey economy will be discussed below. 
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tual number of unemployed.15 The Labour and Employment Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
explains this as the consequence of the social security system encouraging registration as a means to 
gain rights to health insurance and unemployment compensation. Combined with the prevalent un-
employment, the issue of emigration has also affected Bosnian labour markets severely as both 
qualified and unqualified people have left to seek employment abroad. This has caused damage to 
the local human resource base, but at the same time cash remittances sent home by emigrants have 
contributed to the country’s economy. (Labour and Employment Agency of Bosnia and Herze-
govina 2010, 9, 14.) As youth unemployment rates have shown to be constantly high, Bosnia has 
been faced particularly with a brain drain of educated young men and women, who are leaving for 
work in countries such as Croatia, Serbia, Germany and Austria (BiH Ministry for Security 2016, 
61-64). 
Positive achievements in the peacebuilding and reconstruction process of BiH have often been over-
looked. While the DPA was far from a perfect solution to the conflict, nevertheless, it can be seen to 
have achieved its primary goal by managing to put an end to direct violence. Moreover, general liv-
ing standards have recovered significantly, and for large parts of the population the war-inflicted 
destitution is but a memory (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009, 208). Other achievements include a single 
stable currency and a functioning central bank; improvements in the banking sector and the abol-
ishment of socialist-era payment bureaus; measures for demolition of illegal parallel structures in 
FBiH; as well as basic labour and pension reforms (ICG 2001, i). The country’s economy has also 
seen some recovery from the war-time levels of GDP towards today. However, notwithstanding the 
billions of dollars of international assistance, pre-war levels of per capita output have not been 
reached, well-paid and regular employment has not been generated and conditions for economic 
security and poverty alleviation have not been created (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009, 208). Moreover, 
the performance of the ethno-nationalist parties has been poor in alleviating the country’s problems, 
and a high-level of dependency on the international presence has continued to this day (See Mukjić 
& Hulsey 2010, 144). While distrust in the formal political process has been high among BiH citi-
zens, the socio-economic problems have not been witnessed and experienced passively.  
 
                                                          
15 ILO (2018) defines the unemployment rate as the number of persons who are unemployed as a percent of the total 
number of employed and unemployed persons (i.e. the labour force). 
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2.5. The Bosnian Spring of 2014 
The events of the Bosnian Spring started on 4 February 2014 in the city of Tuzla, where factory 
workers protested as a response to the closure of several formerly state-owned companies. The 
failed companies included a detergent company Dita, furniture company Konjuh, gum company 
Resod Guming, chemical company Poliochem and a company producing salt for industrial use, 
Polihem. The new owners of the companies had sold their assets, dismissed their staff and filed for 
bankruptcy. The factory closings and unpaid salaries were in the focus of the protests which gath-
ered more than 10 000 factory workers on the first day. (Guardian 2014; BBC 2014a; New York 
Times 2014; Balkan Insight 2014.) More localized protests transformed into fierce mass demonstra-
tions against unemployment, widespread poverty, corruption and political inaction on 5 February. 
As violent confrontations between the protesters and the law enforcement ensued in Tuzla, by 7 
February the protests had rapidly spread into other cities in the FBiH, including Sarajevo, Mostar, 
Zenica and Bihać. (Murtagh 2016, 154.) The protests were mostly confined to FBiH, but smaller 
protests were also reported in RS – for instance, a rally gathering 300 people in Banja Luka (Guard-
ian 2014; BBC 2014a). The beginning of the protests can be described as intense: the burn-marks 
left on the presidency building can still be seen today in Sarajevo, as the protesters occupied or set 
ablaze many such public buildings. Rioters also targeted offices of political parties: both HDZ and 
SDA party headquarters in Mostar were torched (Reuters 2014).16 Clashes between the protesters 
and the riot police led to hundreds being injured, mostly police facing rains of stones thrown by the 
protesters (Guardian 2014; BBC 2014a; New York Times 2014). 
After the violent start, the protests took a different turn as the protesters turned to direct democracy 
and started organizing plena across FBiH (Murtagh 2016, 154). In the citizens’ assemblies, the pro-
testers formulated demands, to be drafted into lists by ad-hoc working groups and presented to local 
decision-makers, in a non-hierarchical and open-forum manner (YLE 2014; Reuters 2014). From 
the beginning, the movement was rather led and guided by informal citizens’ groups and local asso-
ciations than being formed around single leader figures. Plena were seen in cities such as Sarajevo, 
Tuzla, Zenica, Mostar, Travnik, Brčko, Goražde, Konjic, Cazin, Donji Vakuf, Fojnica, Orašje and 
Bugojno (Riding 2016, 31). The meetings took place in previously collectively owned and since 
fully or semi-privatized (“post-public”) spaces, such as buildings whose construction had been 
funded by post-war NGOs or buildings of the former Houses of Culture, occasionally drawing in 
                                                          
16 During the war, Mostar saw fierce battles between Croat and Bosniak troops, and today it is physically and politically 
divided along the ethnic boundaries. 
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almost a thousand people at a time (Kurtović & Hromadzic 2017, 277). The demands of the protest-
ers were focused on the high corruption and lack of accountability as well as social and economic 
rights – social justice, that is. Appeals were made, for instance, towards revision of allegedly cor-
rupt privatizations, cuts to politicians’ salaries, government resignations as well as investigations to 
the treatment of protesters in the early demonstrations. (Murtagh 2016, 154.) Hence, the protests 
transformed from their more spontaneous, violent and organic form to an organized form of re-
sistance, while more conventional, still uniquely connected to its post-socialist context (See Kur-
tović & Hromadzic 2017).  
Previous research on the 2014 protests have included Sejfija and Fink-Hafner (2016) examining the 
events – referring to “a plenum movement” – from the perspective of political participation in con-
sociational systems. They (ibid., 190-192) remind, importantly, that protests as such are not some-
thing unseen and unexpected in the post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina as hundreds of cases of con-
tentious political activities, such as strikes, peaceful protests, traffic blockades, petitions and 
roundtables focused on particular social and ethnic issues have taken part in the country since 1995. 
Protests have dealt with a range of issues such as police brutality and fragile security, the rights of 
physically impaired persons and infants’ access to health care. According to Sejfija and Fink-
Hafner, the public condemnation of the initially violent protest helped change the form of the pro-
test into plenums as a more institutionalized mode of citizen activity. Sejfija and Fink-Hafner’s ob-
servations17 are corroborated by a report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2001, i, 6-7) 
which notes that some 800 strikes took place already between 1997 and 2001. Only in the year 
2000, 340 strikes took place, along with numerous demonstrations over late or unpaid pensions and 
common roadblocks by workers dissatisfied about a deep economic crisis. Hence, retrospectively it 
can be noted that signs of resistance are nothing new and unique in the context of Bosnia, and that 
the socio-economic problems have not been witnessed passively by the BiH citizens. However, in 
2014 the resistance reached a level that was completely unforeseen in the country’s post-war period 
in terms of its intensity and scale. 
Kurtović and Hromadzic (2017, 263-264, 267, 270-271) state that the significance of the protests 
derived, not from the scope of the violence they included, but from the plena – an experimentation 
of public discussion and political action, inspired by the country’s socialist history and the Yugo-
slav tradition of workers’ self-management. Their research assumes an anthropological scope, mir-
roring the plena against the socialist backdrop. As they argue, “the 2014 Bosnian revolt represents a 
                                                          
17 Kurtović and Hromadzic (2017, 273) also point out similarly that several strikes related to privatization have taken 
place in BiH since the end of the war. 
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grassroots effort to use historical materials to (re)imagine, evoke and activate a new kind of popular 
politics in Bosnia, which [...] seeks to rearticulate grounds for collective agency through socio-
economic rather than identitarian forms of solidarity”. Hence, their analysis points out that the pro-
testers put their socio-economic and biopolitical needs ahead of nationalist divisions. This was evi-
denced by the fact that the protesters targeted the whole political elite in their protests, and not a 
single party or office, and that polls after the first wave of protests showed high support for the pro-
testers even in Serb-majority parts of the country. Particularly the latter spoke against the attempts 
of Serb-nationalist politicians, such as Milorad Dodik, to frame the protests as something orches-
trated by Bosniak parties. 
Similar observations regarding the political alignment of the protesters have also been made by 
Majstorović, Pepić and Vučkovac (2015, 663) who state that the protesters “bypass[ed] ethnic divi-
sion in favour of a proto-civic sense of common citizenship and class solidarity”. Taking the argu-
ment even further, Kurtović (2015, 646) argues that by drawing attention to economic problems and 
refusing to fit to the ethno-political mould, the protesters produced a critique of the current order – 
the nationalism and networks of patronage dominating the daily life of BiH. Indeed, the common 
response from the political elites was to resort to demonising the protesters, and to dismiss them as 
merely representatives of a single ethnic group (Sejfija & Fink-Hafner 2016, 193; Kurtović & 
Hromadzic 2017, 271; Murtagh 2016, 159-160). Hence, it seems that the elites assumed a strategy 
of ethnically framing the incident – fitting it to the current consociationalist mould that works to 
benefit themselves. Nevertheless, Sejfija and Fink-Hafner (2016, 194) note that the plena represent-
ed political innovations, through which the protesters’ demands eventually triggered debates regard-
ing the fundamentals of the Bosnian Constitution. Much of the previous research on the subject 
points out that the protesters managed to question the ethno-nationalist order frozen in place by the 
DPA. 
Stefanovski (2017) compares the Bosnian Spring movement with the 2015 “Citizens for Macedo-
nia” movement in the Republic of Macedonia, shedding light on the causal mechanisms between 
the articulated claims of the social movement organizations and their influence on – or failure to 
influence – specific policy outcomes. Stefanovski (2017, 27-28, 30, 46-47) notes that both of the 
processes were highly similar, and the countries shared a similar background as both had gone 
through a conflict and a direct elite transformation, where old communist officials rebranded and 
entered systems of multi-party democracy, holding high public and party positions again but under 
new labels. However, the political outcomes of the protests differed highly: in Macedonia, the pro-
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tests showed clear signs of impact as the movement was better able to translate its claims into poli-
cy outputs, whereas in Bosnia merely small changes at the cantonal level were achieved. While the 
causal mechanism in Bosnia was activated by the claims-making and repertoires of action per-
formed by the movement members and triggered by the shallow democratization of the country, it 
was eventually broken by the overt police repression and “the lack of friends and allies”. These fac-
tors, along with the distancing of the international community from the process, Stefanovski argues, 
disabled the protest movement from reaching the policy arena and finally being able to articulate 
their claims into policies. 
While on a few occasions the demands of the 2014 plena were ultimately met, more generally, the 
governing political elites refused to reform the political system as demanded. Successes of the plena 
included the resignations of three cantonal prime ministers; electives of the Tuzla Canton Municipal 
Assembly (MA) and the city council of Goražde being denied their ‘white bread’18; Sarajevo Can-
ton MA accepting a range of social reform demands related to social benefits, unemployment and 
pensions and health security; and the representatives of the Assembly of Sarajevo Canton accepting 
20 percent reduction to their salaries. (Sejfija & Fink-Hafner 2016, 193; Murtagh 2016, 155.) In the 
end, the plenum movement tailed away slowly, losing its momentum and dissolving. In his election 
analysis of the General Elections of October 2014, Huskic (2014, 100-101) also confirms that the 
plena ultimately achieved very little but may have triggered an increased focus on the citizens’ 
needs by the international community, as oppose to the prior limited engagement with party leaders. 
Furthermore, what happened as expected was that the protests were utilized in the pre-election 
campaigning by politicians both supporting or condemning the events, as Huskic notes. To con-
clude, what the protests and the plenum movement ultimately revealed and brought to the limelight, 
was the problematic and highly politicized relation between identitarian or ethno-nationalist politics 
and the urgent socio-economic needs of BiH citizens. 
  
                                                          
18 “The right of executive and legislative electives to continue receiving high salaries even after their mandate has end-
ed” (Sejfija & Fink-Hafner 2016, 193). 
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3. Defining Liberal Peace, Liberal Peacebuilding and ‘the Local Turn’ in Peace-
building 
3.1. The One-Size-Fits-All Paradigm of Peacebuilding 
Liberal peace has been one of the central issues of debate in contemporary Peace and Conflict Re-
search and International Relations since the 1990s. It has been described as “[a] one-size-fits-all 
paradigm” for bringing peace to post-conflict areas, “the currently dominant Western form of 
peace-making and peace support” and “the dominant critical intellectual framework” in post-
conflict interventions (Richmond & Franks 2009, 2; Mac Ginty 2008, 139; Sabaratnam 2011, 13). 
Hence, depending on the adopted perspective different aspects have been emphasized, whether it be 
the inflexible nature of liberal peace, its Western, top-down led nature or its vast prevalence in criti-
cal literature. In the core of the paradigm, however, have been its constituent parts of democracy, 
rule of law, civil society and market economics or economic liberalization in the form of develop-
ment and free-market reform (Richmond & Franks 2009, 3; Campbell et al. 2011, 1). These build-
ing-blocks have been derived from a Western, Northern or cosmopolitan state model, seen as the 
ultimate goal towards which to strive (See Richmond 2011). Nonetheless, as can be read from the 
list of constituent parts, the liberal peace paradigm is not only concerned with statebuilding but also 
more comprehensive yet often overlapping peacebuilding efforts. 
Regarding the agency behind the liberal peace project, Richmond and Franks (2009, 2-3, 5) point 
out to the pronounced role of UN peacebuilding, humanitarian and donor assistance, the World 
Bank along with other international financial institutions (IFIs), the UN Development Programme 
(UNDP) and national institutions and experts in the project of “engaging conflict through the con-
struction of the liberal state”. The actors behind liberal peacebuilding have in their multitude re-
sembled an “alphabet soup” as they have delivered “peace-as-governance” (Sabaratnam 2011, 25). 
According to Richmond (2014, 104, 107, 109), liberal peacebuilding “aims at a positive peace by 
virtue of universal norms guiding representation and rights”. Richmond suggests that the universal 
nature of its claims counts out hybrid forms of peace as undesirable.19 The concept itself is deliv-
ered in the form of “universal blueprints” – the same effective standard operating procedures are 
applied as a readymade ‘package’ suitable to all type of post-conflict environments. Through these 
blueprints, local political structures are attempted to transform into “a democratic and human rights-
oriented framework (framed by notions of good governance) with a legal and enforcement capaci-
                                                          
19 The concept of ‘hybrid peace’ will be examined below. 
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ty”. The idea is that the newly-created framework would be internationally and locally legitimate, 
with a top-down guiding authority “vested in global liberal governance, international law and 
norms”, as Richmond notes. 
Historically, promotion of liberal peace has been associated with the post-Cold War period, with a 
particular milestone being the publishing of the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s re-
port An Agenda for Peace in 1992.20 The report sketched-out a new role for the UN in the post-Cold 
War world and emphasised the use of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-
building and addressing of the root causes (“economic despair, social injustice and political oppres-
sion”) of conflicts in order to renew its approach to fulfilling the UN Charter. Aiming for a more 
powerful carte blanche, the report reified the state as the central actor and recognizes the importance 
of respect for sovereignty but mentioned: “[t]he time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, howev-
er, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality.” (United Nations 1992, paragraph 3, 15 & 
17.) Thus, an Agenda for Peace marked the adoption of a more interventionist approach to UN-led 
peace operations and gave a high-level approval for the integration of the central aspects of liberal 
peace (economic liberalization and development; human rights and civil society; democratization 
and rule of law) in peacebuilding as the corresponding remedies for the stated root causes of con-
flicts. 
Nearing the end of the Cold War and in the years following it, the UN’s activity in peacekeeping 
and humanitarian missions rose sharply, leading to operations in countries such as Timor-Leste, Si-
erra Leone, Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, Kosovo, DR Congo, Nicaragua, Namibia, Bosnia, Rwanda and 
Somalia. However, the UN’s failures from Srebrenica to Rwanda soon triggered a process of reflec-
tion within the organization and a search for a more comprehensive approach which eventually also 
rippled into academia (Sabaratnam 2011, 14-19). A main conclusion reached by those assuming a 
critical position was that liberal peace efforts did not lead to stable liberal states and polities, but 
rather to illiberal and fragile ones (See Richmond 2011; Mac Ginty 2011).  
 
                                                          
20 The Dayton Peace Agreement can be seen as reflecting the interventionist approach, which the Agenda for Peace, as 
well as related agendas for democratization and development promoted (Chandler 2000, 34). However, it should be 
noted that the Bosnian peace process was not a UN-led effort, as the organization lacked legitimacy on the basis of its 
perceived failure in protecting civilians in Sarajevo and enclaves of Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde, and was therefore 
largely excluded from the process. 
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3.2. A Move Towards the Local 
Since the early 1990s, a critical academic debate on liberal peace has been shaping. In its current 
form, it has become more distant from the concerns of the policy discourse and formed into a kind 
of meta-critique of contemporary conflict management projects (Sabaratnam 2011, 25). Roberts 
(2011, 410) provides a disaggregation of the different points of criticism which have emerged in an 
easily approachable manner. In general, criticism has been directed at the nature and limit of liberal 
peace (See Sorensen 2002). The ontological model of liberal peace has been seen as narrow (See 
Richmond 2008); its methodologies as non-emancipatory (See Fuller 1992); and the role of the lo-
cal in contemporary peacebuilding as neglected (See Mac Ginty 2008). Finally, a failure of liberal 
institutionalism has been explained by its lacking relevance and legitimacy for sizable parts of the 
population in post-conflict areas (See Boege, Brown, Clements & Nolan 2009). The questions of 
legitimacy as well as local ownership and inclusion rise as the core points of criticism in Roberts’ 
view.  The response of the advocates of liberal orthodoxy to this criticism, on the other hand, has 
been “more of the same, ordered differently and more firmly applied”, as Roberts (2011, 410) sums 
it.  
Although the concept of ‘do no harm’ has been held to high esteem and the fragile balance of post-
conflict situations and integrity of the liberal peace framework have been protected by many of the 
involved international actors, priority of the liberal peacebuilding approach has often been more on 
the international and regional implications of the liberal peace and not its local quality (Richmond 
& Franks 2009, 5). Indeed, this is what connects all criticisms of liberal peace and liberal peace-
building: the undermined role of the local, that is “the use of countless everyday practices that 
transmit critical local agency through a diversity of spheres from the very personal to the transna-
tional level” or “the everyday acts of a diversity of individuals and communities that go beyond 
elites and civil society normally associated with liberal peacebuilding” (Leonardsson & Rudd 2015, 
833). Examining the development of peacebuilding, a clear ‘local turn’ can even be identified in the 
literature. In their thorough literature review concerning the local turn, Leonardsson and Rudd 
(ibid., 826) identify two distinct dimensions in the literature. In the first dimension, effectiveness of 
peacebuilding is the core issue, with an emphasis being on the role of sub-national governments in 
peacebuilding and statebuilding as well as the concept of local ownership and local capacity build-
ing. The second dimension, on the other hand, focuses on issues of emancipation and “voices from 
below”, criticising the current interpretation of the local in peacebuilding and arguing for the inclu-
sion of local agency. 
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The formation of a local turn in peacebuilding literature does not entail that ‘the local’ has not been 
a common point of discussion in the practice of peacebuilding already for years – rather that its ac-
tual value has so far been largely rhetorical (See Richmond 2010, 667).21 In the UN context, the im-
portance of building local capacity and “reformed systems of governance that are responsive to 
people’s basic needs at the local, regional and national levels’ was recognized by Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan in 2001 (United Nations 2001). This marked a change in peace interventions, con-
cerned with overseeing ceasefires, towards the inclusion of capacity building and promotion of gov-
ernance measures in their toolkits in order to bring peacebuilding closer to the local (Leonardsson & 
Rudd 2015, 827). Yet, the lack of an actual impact beyond the words is evidence by a steadily 
growing amount of criticism aimed at the success of the UN’s peace operations. The UN’s recogni-
tion of the importance of the local also coincided with a pronounced interventionist tendency – one 
that had only grown from the days of the Agenda for Peace due to the adoption of the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P) doctrine in 2001 (See ICISS 2001). The growing interventionism did not help in 
countering criticism towards the top-down led nature of liberal peace. 
What has been proposed as ‘a cure’ to the shortcomings of liberal peace by Roberts (2011, 412-413, 
421-422), is a form of ‘popular peace’, or a peace, which is still led by the liberal institutions but 
with an emphasis on the relevance to the everyday life of the population rather than to the elite ac-
tors of the North and the South. The ‘everyday’ itself refers to “routines of life that empower people 
to manage their existence to the best of their abilities without reference to the formal regulation of 
the private sphere by the biopolitical state” as well as the “sanctioned ways in which, to secure their 
being, people outsmart their environmental limitations and manage the gaps between constraints 
and aspirations in the face of inadequate, disinterested and incompetent authority and power”. The 
type of peace that takes the everyday aspects into account, as Roberts argues, would be more demo-
cratic, participatory and representative, without a reliance on the type of “universal blueprints” ap-
proach which liberal peacebuilding assumes. Hence, legitimacy would be tied with the everyday in 
a potentially emancipatory manner. 
In addition to the concept of popular peace, other names for alternatives to liberal peace have 
emerged. These include the concepts of “emancipatory peace”, “post-liberal peace” or “hybrid 
peace” which all draw from the same emancipatory influences as “popular peace” (See Richmond 
2011; Roberts 2011). Hybridity is a term, often used to refer to the relation and interactions between 
the interveners and local society as well as their mutual transformations (See Belloni 2012; Mac 
                                                          
21 This criticism is particularly evident in the second dimension of ‘local turn’ literature identified by Leonardsson and 
Rudd (See Leonardsson & Rudd 2015, 832-833). 
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Ginty 2010 & 2011). According to Richmond (2011, 187, 189, 194, fig. 6), peacebuilding based on 
both liberal and local aspects of peace “would be constructed by its subjects, not merely by often 
well-intentioned external actors and internationals”. A post-liberal form of peacebuilding would ul-
timately be the “[o]utcome of dynamics of mutual acceptance, co-option, resistance, rejection; dif-
fering in each context” and would lead to a post-liberal or emancipatory peace based on hybridity. 
This form of peace would rather recognize difference, needs and cultures than aim for compliance. 
Including the local at the centre of peacebuilding would not necessarily cause a displacement of 
power, however, it would bring critical agencies in rights, needs and institutional terms out of the 
periphery, enabling them. Finally, Richmond notes that this would not be dissonant with the way 
liberal peace already focuses on the civil society and its emancipatory groups, but rather bring an 
emphasis on the components of local alterity, identity, custom and culture as sites of critical agency. 
To counter criticism towards the ideas advocated by the supporters of the local-turn in peacebuild-
ing, Richmond (2010, 667-669) raises two vital points. Firstly, approaching hybridity and moving 
beyond liberal peacebuilding would not entail abandoning liberal peace, but rather reconnecting it 
with its subject while recognizing the diversity of post-conflict contexts. Hence, Richmond 
acknowledges the complexity of conflict situations and the necessity of conventional frameworks 
for promoting peace, i.e. ‘the peacebuilding machinery’ which brings in the resources and navigates 
the high-level political sphere. Secondly, he gives a gentle reminder that the intention is not to ro-
manticize the capacity, resistance or agency of the local (See Mac Ginty 2008). Vice versa, the eve-
ryday or the local is not equated with non-liberalism, illiberalism or liberalism, and essentialist as-
sumptions regarding its inherently ‘peaceful’, ‘conflictual’, or anything in between, nature are to be 
avoided in Richmond’s view. As Jarstad and Belloni (2012, 4) point out, it may even be possible 
that hybrid peace governance serves to strengthen “patriarchal, feudal, sexist, and violent political 
and social systems” – or on the other hand, it may create truly legitimate domestic institutions and 
stabilize the peace process ensuring that its rooted in the domestic reality.  
To conclude, the core argument of the alternatives offered by the local turn advocates is that there 
seems to be a rupture and a disconnection between liberal peacebuilding and its subjects. This high-
ly affects its legitimacy, efficiency, local ownership and inclusivity as well as its emancipatory na-
ture, and does not lead to a lasting state of peace which would go way beyond mere cessation of 
hostilities and direct violence. 
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4. Criticism of (Neo)Liberal Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
4.1. Political Elites, Internationals and the Unquestioned ‘Ethnicity’ 
Stagnation is the word that best describes the success of the liberal peacebuilding project in BiH. 
Indeed, Richmond and Franks (2009, 56-57) point out that the process, as envisaged by the interna-
tional community, has not led to the desired outcomes: Bosnia has been left with a virtual and con-
servative form of liberal peace, an unresolved conflict, a fragile security situation and a socio-
economic crisis. One of the core reasons for this has been the lack of cooperation between the polar-
ised and nationalistic political elites22 and the international community. The political elites have 
opted out of the process in order to maintain the upper hand, as it can be argued that a liberal demo-
cratic state would ultimately impair their political, social and cultural power bases. (Kappler & 
Richmond 2014, 272; Donais 2005, 13.) The main lesson of this is that the liberal peacebuilding 
process in BiH has not reached a complete or ideal stage: while some constituent parts of liberal 
peace have been adopted (such as free elections as a part of democratisation), others have been re-
sisted by the political elites (such as the ECtHR rulings on the Sejdić and Finci, Zornić or Pilav cas-
es) or even ignored by the international community (such as the eventual shortcomings of interna-
tionally imposed privatization schemes). 
Criticism of post-conflict liberal statebuilding reveals the paradox between international and local 
ownership of the statebuilding process in BiH. This refers to the apparent desire of the international 
community to hand over direct control and ownership of the process to the local actors, while sim-
ultaneously ensuring compliance to their liberal agenda. (Richmond & Franks 2009, 57.) Although 
some progress has certainly been made in some individual fields such as elections, the rule of law 
and civil society, and the role of the OHR has diminished with the use of the so-called Bonn Powers 
being in practice inconceivable, the hand-over is far from complete, and the international communi-
ty remains a force that in its part maintains the status quo in the country. From its perspective, the 
political elites have been unwilling to cooperate, repeating the same antagonistic rhetoric that ren-
ders all attempts towards reform futile, especially during times when general elections are looming. 
As Mukjić & Hulsey (2010, 144) note, while the leaders and set of parties change from election to 
election, the rhetoric of the victorious politicians has remained the same. 
                                                          
22 This research uses the definition of Burton & Higley (1987, 296): “Elites are simply people who are able, through 
their positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes individually, regularly, and seriously. 
Elites thus constitute a nation's top leadership in all sectors-political, governmental, business, trade union, military, me-
dia, religious, and intellectual-including both ‘establishment’ and ‘counterelite’ factions.” 
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Peacebuilding is torn between two different versions of liberalism: a conservative version – as has 
been actualised in Bosnia – which focuses on the state as the vehicle of security and regulation, un-
derpinned by territorial sovereignty, as well as a version which sees peacebuilding as a more eman-
cipatory and empathetic activity and is more concerned with a sophisticated order of justice and 
everyday equity. While the aim of both of these approaches, included as a part of the imaginary of 
‘global governance’, is positive peace23, they have led to top-down, elite-led and official peace-
building processes, and at best only a negative hybrid peace. A key problem has been the inability 
of liberal peacebuilding to recognize difference and deliver a peace dividend at the grassroots level, 
as oppose to its normative and cosmopolitan goals. In the end, the peace dividend and power have 
stayed in elite possession. (Richmond 2014, 113-115.) The central role of elites applies particularly 
to Bosnia, where the peace process has been highly elite-led from the beginning.24 Moreover, the 
top-down mentality is evident in the criticism of the international community holding a “protec-
torate”-like quality, particularly manifested through the early use of the Bonn Powers to impose leg-
islative solutions and dismiss public official (See Chandler 2000; Pugh 2002; Dursun-Ozkanca 
2010).  
The inability of liberal peacebuilding to recognize the ‘difference’, as was described by Richmond 
(2014, 113-115), is manifested in Bosnia through arguments aiming to reinforce the legitimacy of 
the intervention in the form of certain commonly repeated clichés or assumptions. One of these is to 
understand Bosnian party politics as a direct extension of the war to the extent that it is completely 
dominated by wartime elites at the level of persons. To prove this claim false, one need only con-
sider the results of the 2014 elections, where 15 of the 22 parties who made it into entity or state 
parliaments were founded after the war and none of the 22 actually had a leader who was already in 
charge before 1995 (ESI 2017, 16). The big wartime political parties, on the other hand, still play an 
important role and even contentious figures convicted of war crimes occasionally appear at different 
governmental levels. Yet, there often seems to be a lack of critical disaggregation when the elites 
are pinpointed as a source of troubles. More importantly, ethnic polarization and identities are other 
central issues, which tend to be targets of simplifications and generalizations. Ethnicity is often de-
scribed as the central issue: even Richmond and Franks (2009, 69) mention that “the main barrier to 
                                                          
23 ‘Positive peace’ is a classic concept in Peace and Conflict Research, coined by Johan Galtung. He defines the concept 
as an opposite to negative peace, which he uses to refer to mere absence of direct personal violence. Positive peace, on 
the other hand, encompasses in addition to absence of direct violence also the absence of structural violence, i.e. the 
prevalence of social justice. (Galtung 1969, 183-186.) 
24 However, there have also been signs of international actors readjusting their efforts towards the local in some fields 
when the elites have shown hostility towards reform. For instance, according to Perry and Keil (2013, 379-380) the 
OSCE Mission to BiH increased its engagement with the local level in education issues after the will to reform started 
deteriorating at the political level from 2006. 
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progress in human rights is the discrimination inherent within the society based on ethnicity, which 
is of course reinforced by the structure of Dayton”.25 However, is Bosnia really a society based on 
ethnicity? While there certainly is truth to the issue of ethnic polarization as Bosnia is, indeed, see-
ing even more of it, a more relevant question would be at what levels of society does the polariza-
tion actually concern and how does it affect the everyday?26 
At the level of party politics, Bosnia does have a political climate where ethnicity is one of the cen-
tral issues and parties mostly compete for votes within their own ethnic constituencies. However, to 
claim that there are no compromises being made and that the system is utterly inflexible would be 
unfounded, as coalition building and concessions are encouraged by a flexible approach towards 
ethnic identities and quotas as well as the federalism and proportional representation components 
(ESI 2017, 20; See Lippman 2015, 36-37).27 On the other hand, the entity-voting veto mechanism 
of the Parliamentary Assembly has proven to make inter-ethnic non-cooperation more advantageous 
rather than compromise for those benefiting from the status-quo (Bahtić-Kunrath 2011, 918). More-
over, ethno-nationalism is in fact a defining ideological feature of most of the political parties cur-
rently represented in the state-level Parliament today. The performance of the nationalist parties has 
been poor, as evidenced by the unemployment rate consistently exceeding 40% and the incredibly 
slow pace of passing much needed legislation to improve the situation (Mukjić & Hulsey 2010, 
144). Hence, it seems that in forming coalitions and maintaining their power position the political 
elites are willing to compromise over questions of ethnicity, but when it comes to agreeing on polit-
ical issues there is less cooperativeness between the parties. 
The ethno-nationalist parties’ rise to power in the elections leading to the breakup of Yugoslavia 
has been explained in simplified arguments pointing to a process of “unmediated democratiza-
tion”.28 29 Claims of the inability of Eastern European or Balkan countries to elect ‘the correct’ 
leaders because of their unpreparedness for democracy, ethnic culture or mere irrationality have 
been used to justify international interventions and liberal democratization efforts (See Chandler 
                                                          
25 Italics added 
26 Richmond (2014, 57) verifies that ethnic polarization has only increased in Bosnia. 
27 For instance, the structure of civil servants in civil service should reflect the country’s demographic/ethnic structure, 
yet public employees are not required by state-level law to declare their ethnicity – it is based on voluntary self-
identification (ESI 2017, 6-10). 
28 For instance, Chua (2004, 174-175) states that in the events leading to the breakup of former Yugoslavian it was un-
mediated democratization that triggered the release of suppressed ethnic hatred and caused nationalist demagogues to 
rise to power, while economic and political liberalization instigated the ethnic polarization. 
29  In the 1990 elections, the three leading ethnic parties gathered won most of the seats in the two-chamber legislature: 
35.8% or 86 seats for the (Muslim) Party of Democratic Action (SDA), 30% or 72 seats for the Serbian Democratic 
Party (SDS) and 18.3% or 44 seats for the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) (Friedman 2004, 35). The same ethno-
nationalist parties still play a vital role in the political life of today’s Bosnia. 
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2000; Friedman 2004). For this reason, such claims should also be viewed through a highly critical 
lens. Chandler (2000, 30-32) notes relating to the beginning of the international intervention in 
Bosnia, “[t]he war was held to have demonstrated the problems of unrestrained democratic autono-
my in a society where often both the electorate and its leaders were alleged to be without civilised 
values or morality”. However, a more likely explanation for the success of the ethno-nationalists lay 
in the collapse of the Yugoslav state and the security void it left as the question of security became 
an essential one amid a lack of the counterbalancing mechanism of the federal state. Given that eth-
nic or nationalist factions did exist in Bosnia despite a generally peaceful multi-ethnic coexistence 
at the everyday level, they became the point of reference for security guarantees and equal treatment 
for each of the three ethnic groups amid growing secessionism in the surrounding Yugoslav repub-
lics, Chandler explains.30 
Paradoxically, the repeated victories of the ethno-nationalist parties, which have continued to the 
present, do not necessarily entail that all of their voters subscribe to their views. Mukjić and Hulsey 
(2010, 145-152) explain this argument by examining Bosnian politics through the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma and Assurance Games which produce similar results: Bosnian voters may prefer a change to 
the current state of affairs and wish to remove ineffective politicians but still vote for the ethno-
nationalists believing that the voters belonging to other ethnic groups will do the same. The zero-
sum perception of voters has its roots in the country’s political climate, which is shaped by incum-
bent ethno-nationalist parties who maintain high influence over different media outlets. Hence, ad-
vocating for zero-sum policies, such as the Croat calls for a third entity, Republika Srpska’s seces-
sion or the abolition of the entity system, is the most profitable approach for ethno-nationalist poli-
ticians. Ultimately, citizens see voting for a nationalist party as the less risky option and serving 
their interests better than voting for a non-nationalist party, Mukjić and Hulsey argue. Their claim is 
corroborated by the wide gap of distrust between politicians and the citizens. The gap is visible in 
surveys by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2017, 18, 21-22) cover-
ing the year 2016, which point out that 74% of BiH citizens believe that political parties are only 
working for their own interests and not those of citizens. Furthermore, a mere 6% in FBiH and 7% 
in RS believe that they are represented by political parties. The prevalent distrust and feeling of not 
being represented give a signal of a notable weakness in the legitimacy of the policies of ethno-
nationalist political parties who, regardless, keep on succeeding at the polls. 
                                                          
30 The same also applied in the first elections after the war in 1996: “In a tense post-war setting a certain logic then ap-
plies, where it is portrayed as dangerous for one group to divide its votes across a larger number of parties, for this will 
potentially weaken the group vis-à-vis the others, assuming they are united behind their own parties. Voting thus turns 
into a game of chicken.” (Søberg 2006, 49.) 
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In contrast to the dominant role of ethno-nationalist political parties, flexibility towards ethnic iden-
tities at the local level has a long history in Bosnia. Prior to the nationalists’ victory in the elections 
of 1990, Bosnia was internationally seen as a model of multicultural co-existence and a symbol of 
Yugoslavia’s progressive minority policies (Chandler 2000, 29).31 Moreover, the system was differ-
ent in terms of understanding rights: in the pre-war period, emphasis was based on collective rather 
than individual rights (Richmond & Franks 2009, 68). Yet the breakup of Yugoslavia and the war 
of 1992 - 1995 can be seen to have caused a disruption and a division in the entire fabric of Bosnian 
society. Before the war, multi-ethnicity was very deeply enmeshed at the lowest level and common-
ly existed within families, but in developments similar to the situation in Iraq (where the Sunni and 
Shi’a distinction did not matter highly within families before the conflicts) the conflict highlighted 
ethnic difference, problematising the issue for the first time and causing serious difficulties32 within 
families (ibid. 69). Hence, the war did cause major divisions also at the everyday level particularly 
in “mixed-marriage” families and increased distrust between communities.  
As Tolomelli (2015, 94) points out, the war, indeed, was a breaking point in the peaceful multi-
ethnic and multi-religious coexistence. Furthermore, an aspect where ethnic polarization has influ-
enced everyday life is the country’s education system, where segregation according to ethnicity is a 
daily reality. A system referred to as ‘two schools under one roof’ was originally put in place as an 
interim measure to allow children from different ethnic groups to use the same school facilities at 
different allocated times and be taught a number of different subjects such as language, history and 
religion (See Tolomelli 2015). However, the education system reform has been extremely slow, and 
signs of backsliding have been evident. As a consequence, the system has held its place in many 
areas despite the fact that it was intended to be temporary. This has been particularly problematic 
for children from “mixed-marriage” families, as belonging to the “others” of the DPA’s Annex IV, 
they have had to assimilate into one of the three available ethnic boxes. Hence, in fields such as ed-
ucation, the DPA functioned as the final touch to exclusion and division – not only dividing the sys-
                                                          
31 There existed a viable civic or multi-ethnic alternative to the nationalist road prior to the elections in Bosnia. This is 
supported by the fact that 74 percent of the population were in favour of a ban on nationally or confessionally based 
parties only six months from the 1991 elections – the ban was later overturned by the Constitutional Court (Bougarel 
1996, 99). Mukjić and Hulsey (2010, 155) note that a Prisoner’s Dilemma-like situation started developing in the year 
leading to the elections as the nature of the campaigning changed and the election outcomes from the other republics 
showed success for nationalist parties.  
32 “The conflict not only turned neighbours against each other but also divided families under the same roof, while indi-
viduals with parents from different ethnic groups were forced to choose allegiances and families were irreparably divid-
ed” (Richmond and Franks 2009, 69). 
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tem of governance, but likewise ensuring that the society stay divided after the war in a constitu-
tional straitjacket.  
Richmond and Franks (2009, 68) point out that one of the major flaws of the international liberal 
peacebuilders has been to take the ethnic ‘sides’ culturally as given. Thus, the peacebuilders’ mis-
understanding of the fluidity and flexibility of identities shows a lack of understanding of ‘the eve-
ryday’ and related differences. There are a variety of answers to the question as to whether Bosnia 
is a society based on ethnicity: it may be based on ethnicity in terms of the Annex IV of DPA, polit-
ical influence of ethno-nationalist parties, the education system and the deterioration in multi-ethnic 
coexistence caused by the war, but more importantly it is not permeated by ethnicity. Ethnicity is 
not the sole defining factor for identities and the ethno-nationalist cleavages do not necessarily 
dominate the everyday realm as much as they do in the legislatures.  Hence, to claim that Bosnians 
would somehow be irrational or be living amid ‘an everyday apartheid’ mentality regarding ethnici-
ty would be unfounded and a major simplification. To bring the actual significance of the issue at 
the everyday level into perspective, in the 2016 USAID survey, BiH citizens rank unemployment 
(58%) and low salaries, pensions and standard of living (12%) as major development problems, ra-
ther than inter-ethnic distrust and political irresponsibility (2%) and see economic affairs as the first 
priority which the government should focus on (59%) (USAID 2017, 19-20). Hence, the view from 
the top-down seems to have become somewhat distorted and the issues that actually matter for the 
everyday have not been distinguished and addressed well. 
All in all, the cooperation between the international community and the political elites has been un-
successful and is reflected in the type of dysfunctional liberal peace left in Bosnia. Following the 
local-turn criticism of liberal peacebuilding, three core aspects where liberal peace has seen failures 
in Bosnia are the lack of local ownership or inclusivity (as manifested by the elite-led nature of the 
peace process, the failed hand-over and the ‘protectorate’-like quality of the top-down international 
intervention), legitimacy (as manifested by the uncooperativeness of the political elites and the citi-
zens’ high distrust towards political parties and feelings of not being represented by them) and effi-
ciency (as manifested by the poor performance of political parties and common legislative grid-
locks, the unresolved conflict, fragile security situation, socio-economic crisis and the virtual and 
conservative form of liberal peace which has developed). In addition to these points of criticism, 
there is a fourth one, that of economic emancipation.  
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4.2. Neoliberal Implications of Liberal Peacebuilding 
The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrates how neo-liberal economic reforms and the 
shortcomings of formal democracy combine to create a kind of ‘perpetual transition’ char-
acterized by unstable, socially divisive developmental patterns and low-level democracy, 
which obstruct progress to meaningful ‘peace’ (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009, 214). 
While the leaps from multiethnicity to institutionalized ethnic segregation and from the emphasis of 
collective rights to universal and individualistic human rights certainly shaped Bosnia as it is today, 
an evenly large transformation concerned Bosnia’s whole economic system. Pre-war Yugoslavia 
had its own brand of market socialism which emphasized markets to guide international and domes-
tic production and exchange but had socialist elements stemming from “social ownership” and 
workers’ self-management of enterprises (Estrin 1991, 187). Yugoslavia was already draggingly 
transitioning just before the conflict, but more effectively a neoliberal economic paradigm was laid 
down for Bosnia at the first two donor conferences in 1995 and 1996 by the World Bank, EC and 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The external agencies and aid donors de-
clared that the economic and development strategy would be governed by the private sector with 
employment to be generated through small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and policies of 
economic liberalization. (Divjak & Pugh 2008, 380-381.) Typically, the building blocks towards 
economic transformation, as assumed by liberal peacebuilding, have been macro-economic stabil-
ity, reduction of the role of the state, squeezing of collective and public space, a quest for private 
affluence and a high reliance on privatization, exports and foreign investment to stimulate growth 
(Pugh 2005, 25). Hence, the expected road to transformation for Bosnia was to be long and winding 
– and eventually the process turned out to be anything but unproblematic. 
Richmond (2014, 79-80) argues that neoliberal democracies, as a product of a liberal statebuilding 
process, are characterized by a weak civil society as well as a limited capacity to engage in global 
markets and provide basic services. These states would fail without international support, and their 
citizenship tends to be polarised around elite preferences which also depend on international sup-
port. Moreover, a weak civil society, property and boundary-focused security and, altogether, a 
weak state give the local elites control over the neoliberal state along with its assets. Thus, neoliber-
al democracies benefit the local elites and ‘the trickle down’ justifies their economic positions and 
control of power. In the end, as Richmond notes: “[t]he post-conflict state is held together by a ma-
terial and ideological alliance between international personnel and local elites”. What is left ignored 
by liberal peace is that the neoliberal approach neglects realities of everyday life and the immediate 
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nature of the needs of the locals: even when it does work, waiting for a ‘trickle-down wealth’ can 
take years and cannot provide a solution to the actual and urgent popular needs (Roberts 2011, 412). 
Furthermore, it has been noticed that neoliberal influence over peacebuilding misunderstands how 
markets in post-conflict situations work: those versed in their practice and circumvention are al-
lowed to undermine democracy, human rights and rule of law, rather than to support them (Rich-
mond 2014, 118; See Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009, 203). 
Pugh (2002, 469-470) joins Richmond and Roberts in his criticism of the neoliberalist approach 
adopted by the international community in BiH, which he along with Chandler (2000) refers to as 
“a protectorate”, examining the first six years after the war. According to him, the neoliberal ap-
proach did not benefit the bulk of the entities’ citizens who were living in poverty, unemployed and 
lacking proper pension, while the cost of living was high. The heritage of pre-war and wartime po-
litical economy made clientelism, corporatism, prebendary elites and nationalist acquisition also 
defining features of the post-war situation, Pugh discovers. More than two decades after the con-
flict, these features are still well and alive in BiH: for instance, clientelism – or quid pro quo ex-
change of goods, services or benefits for political power – is a lifeblood to the political elites. Ac-
cording to Pugh’s (2002, 470-471) description, clientelism also partly determined the distribution of 
assets and access to economic gains in the early years after the conflict, or as he notes: “[v]ertically 
integrated enterprises, controlled by political parties and patrimonies, link[ed] the welfare of sup-
porters to economic empires encompassing hotels, casinos, restaurants, banks, tobacco, forestry, 
telecommunications, energy, and water companies”. Furthermore, Kurtović and Hromadzic (2017, 
269) suggest that clientelism, as a form of coercion and political intimidation towards alternative 
forms of political belonging and engagement, has also contributed to the continuing electoral suc-
cess of the ethno-nationalist parties throughout the years. 
While constitutional accountability and legal norms and processes mediated the common clien-
telism weakly, another aspect which was left under the radar was the growing significance of in-
formal or illegal economies. In the Bosnian grey or “survival” economy, many people relied on di-
aspora remittances, foreign aid, barter, pay back for demobilized soldiers or undeclared earnings. 
(Pugh 2002, 472.) Divjak and Pugh (2008, 381-383) argue that illiberal informal economy – not to 
be confused with organized crime or corruption – supports sustaining resistance towards the social-
ly alienating neoliberalism. It has become even more resilient along the way when transition 
benchmarks in the neoliberal reform process have been reached. At the same time the unemploy-
ment rate has grown, and more and more young women and men aspire leaving the country, Divjak 
  
35 
 
and Pugh finally add. The role of corruption33 in deterring foreign investment and making Bosnia a 
difficult environment to run a business has also been evident and stood in stark contrast to the coun-
try’s aid dependency. BiH citizens’ perceptions paint a solemn picture of the phenomenon: 96 % 
believe that corruption is present in public sector employment and 92 % in public procurement 
(USAID 2017, 28-30). 
Another poorly regulated aspect was the national privatization process of BiH (See Pugh 2002, 
274). Donais (2002, 4, 13) describes that the planning of the process was incoherent from the be-
ginning: the transition from humanitarian relief to economic reform was intended to be staged and 
orderly, but privatization was driven forward on its own tracks. The BiH privatization programme 
was developed under the guidance of USAID, largely detached from the economic reform process 
overseen by the OHR. Moreover, it had a completely different timeline: USAID had envisaged the 
privatization to be completed already within two years from its inception in 1997. Hope was opti-
mistically pinned on an increase of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a result of privatization, and 
the involvement of foreign investors was seen as a way to counter the risk of ethnic privatization. 
However, the prompt tempo designated for the process ultimately clashed with what Donais identi-
fies as a serious problem, that is, “the absence of an appropriate institutional framework – including 
those institutions underpinning the rule of law, functioning and well-regulated capital markets, an 
efficient tax-collection regime, and an effective banking system”. In the end, the process progressed 
in a slow and stalling manner because of the lack of institutions and attractive companies as well as 
due to the prevalent political obstructions (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009, 207). 
Consequently, amid a lack of well-functioning institutions to regulate the privatization process, the 
obvious happened: those already “versed in the[...] practice and circumvention [of markets in post-
conflict situations]” and the “resourceful, agile and well connected few”, namely those holding 
powerful positions in the wartime political economy, were the ones to profit (See Donais 2002, 4; 
Richmond 2014, 118). Aiming to depoliticize economic life and to provide a basis for growth and 
recovery, privatization failed on both accounts, ending up as a corrupt, ethnicized and protracted 
struggle for power. The country’s complex institutional set-up created along the DPA only in-
creased the difficulty of regulating the process properly: Bosnia had 10 cantonal and two entity pri-
vatization agencies, and while a Privatization Monitoring Commission was formed, it did not pre-
vent the conflict fault lines from extending to privatization as well. Particularly the voucher privati-
zation carried out in the early post-war years was exploited by the wealthy, corrupt and well-
                                                          
33 Following Divjak & Pugh’s (2008) narrow political definition: “abuse of public position for personal or factional 
gain” (Divjak & Pugh 2008, 373). 
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connected to consolidate their power.34 The voucher-approach was taken up to transfer state assets – 
particularly more marginal companies – quickly into private hands and to liquidate citizens claims 
against the state (e.g. unpaid salaries for soldiers and frozen foreign currency accounts), but it did 
not prevent asset-stripping and selling of the certificates for fractions of their full face value by their 
new, desperate owners. (Donais 2002, 2, 5-6, 10.)  
Hence, the immediate everyday necessities and realities of the common Bosnians were not met – 
how was one to develop a business, unemployed and without proper social welfare? In such situa-
tions where actual options are limited, the short-term gain of selling the shares quickly forward 
would naturally outweigh the long-term. On the other hand, it must be noted that the premises for 
running a business were not optimal either from the perspective of the buyers: the new owners, of-
ten so called PIFs (Funds for Privatization Investments), lacked fresh capital for needed investments 
and restarting of production but also had to deal with the inherited debts of the privatized enterpris-
es (Simić 2001).35 This meant that the prevailing situation only encouraged short-sighted solutions. 
Controversially, there was also a lack of privatization of companies run by political elites them-
selves, more for their personal benefit rather than that of the state. In the end, the situation func-
tioned to deter the expected FDI and to make domestic investment less tempting and beneficial. 
(Divjak & Pugh 2008, 377.)  
The imposition of an advanced economic system which assumes that unemployed and poor individ-
uals can contribute to economic growth extensively, while a lack of a well-functioning welfare sys-
tem ensures that they have no stake in the economy, democracy nor the state, is at the core of the 
ambivalence of liberal peacebuilding in Bosnia (Richmond & Franks 2009, 75-76). Moreover, as 
Bojicic-Dzelilovic (2009, 202) argues, the socially polarizing growth has increased economic inse-
curity which in turn halts the progress towards more constructive and inclusive democratic politics 
and interest-based political participation, away from divisive issues such as ethnicity. The end result 
of the process has been more than two decades of stagnation, grey economy, corruption, clientelism, 
economic exploitation, predatory elites and a dependency on a long-living international presence. 
The ones who have had to bear the most expenses have been the poor, unemployed, badly connect-
                                                          
34 Donais (2002, 8) on voucher privatization: “This strategy, adopted most comprehensively in [post-socialist] Russia 
and the Czech Republic, involved the free distribution of vouchers to the general population, which individuals could 
then convert into shares of privatized enterprises, either directly or through managed investment funds. While offering a 
relatively quick fix to the problem of transferring state assets into private hands, as well as helping to secure public sup-
port for privatization, this solution meant abandoning any hope of generating badly-needed revenues for the state 
through the sale of public enterprises.”  
35 Simić (2001) depicts a situation where the PIFs were against FBiH authorities insisting them to write off the inherited 
debts in order to protect the companies’ employees. The authorities claimed that PIFs were exploiting the employees as 
a pretext and as an attempt to “rob the state” and were well aware of the debt before buying the companies. 
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ed and those not willing to dig themselves into the ethno-nationalist foxholes and take part in the 
patronage networks. All in all, Richmond’s (2014, 117) reality check is validated by the shortcom-
ings of liberal peacebuilding in Bosnia: “[T]he liberal peace framework has been aimed at reform-
ing or creating social democracies open for international trade rather than social democracies creat-
ed to reconcile and support their citizens’ welfare”. 
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5. Resistance Emanating from the Lack of Everyday Necessities 
5.1. Resistance in Hybridity Literature and its Criticism 
It is not a truism that top-down approaching, autonomy deferring and compliance demanding liberal 
peacebuilding efforts are always happily received by their beneficiaries in different post-conflict 
spaces. Peacebuilding can be seen as a political process which establishes the distribution of eco-
nomic and political goods, such as privileges, rights and access to material resources and decision-
making power, continuing and altering the pre-conflict distribution mechanisms (Iñiguez de Heredia 
2017, 1). For this reason, resistance is often seen from those simultaneously constituting and taking 
part in the process. However, the concept itself has not been completely unambiguous, and there 
have been different understandings of it in the theoretical literature. Some, like Richmond (2014), 
Mac Ginty (2011; 2012) and Mitchell (2011) approach resistance from the perspective of hybridity, 
seeing it as a component in the construction of hybrid peace. From Richmond’s (2014, 121) per-
spective, resistance towards liberal peace has happened at times overtly through demonstrations and 
violence but more often behind the scenes in a careful way not to undermine peace efforts, rather to 
guide them. Hence, external demands and implications may be resisted both materially and discur-
sively, often in more marginal, fragmented and hidden manner yet still effectively. Kappler & 
Richmond (2011, 274) disaggregate the different forms of resistance further: 
Resistance can occur in different ways, such as operating in hidden spaces provided by cul-
tural or customary frameworks; creating small civil society advocacy organizations for 
identity, needs or rights purposes; vocal and physical resistance; discursive deconstruction 
or co-option of institutional frameworks for governance; and through a process of negotia-
tion over the nature of the peace that is being laid down. [...] This produces hybrid forms of 
peace, representative of local forms of agency and their unexpected capacities. (ibid.) 
Richmond (2014, 13) additionally argues that political mobilisation for peace constructs legitimacy, 
be the mobilisation in a mass grassroots scale or in a more hidden and fragmented way. In this 
manner, resistance and critical agency can be seen as a solution to the shortcomings of liberal 
peacebuilding, making it more aware and sensitive towards the everyday and therefore more effec-
tive for tackling issues faced by the local. Accordingly, resistance at the local level is seen by 
Richmond (2010, 671, 686, 669) as a way to build a new form of peace, constructed on contextual 
and everyday terms. The everyday, itself, he describes as a site of dynamics, which include re-
sistance and politicisation, solidarity, local agency and hybridity, but also depoliticization and pas-
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sivity. These visions are in line with Richmond’s aim of not romanticizing the local. Hence, while 
local resistance towards liberal peace can be seen as a move towards hybrid peace, it should also be 
understood as potentially having a counterproductive effect towards it. 
Other hybridity theorists adopt definitions of resistance with a varying degree of sophistication and 
precision. For Mac Ginty (2011, 78), resistance is broadly “the ability of local actors, networks, and 
structures to resist, ignore, subvert, and adapt liberal peace interventions”. He (2012, 167-168) at-
tempts to expand the hybridity theorists’ debate on resistance by questioning the equation of every-
day actions – including mundane actions, such as farming land and going to school – with compli-
ance to liberal peace. This he does by unpacking the concept of non-participation and hinting: “[a]n 
over-emphasis on the liberal peace and orthodox forms of development amounts to another means 
of ignoring subaltern voices”. Mitchell (2011, 31), on the other hand, deepens the definition of re-
sistance as “a mutual dynamic in which all parties feel capable of (at least to some degree) control-
ling, shaping or intervening in the acts, powers or logics that shape their lives”, understanding both 
“the powerful” and “the weak” as subjects and objects of resistance. Hence, she brings the issue of 
power relations to the discussion yet ends up leaving some crucial questions unanswered: for in-
stance, what would resistance from the powerful towards the weak actually mean in this context 
(See Iñiguez de Heredia 2017, 6)? 
Importantly, it should be noted that critical voices have risen regarding the common way how the 
hybridity theorists approach resistance as a constituent part in hybrid peace. For instance, Nadarajah 
and Rampton (2015, 51, 71) argue that hybrid peace ignores the importance of historical co-
constitution of the local, national and international as well as the power relations connected to them. 
They advocate for a context sensitive and historically informed scholarly engagement with a focus 
on the “interwoven and often violent dynamics of domination and resistance” in which explicit po-
sitions should be taken. From Chandler’s (2013, 27, 31) perspective, hybrid or non-linear views 
lack understanding of the social and economic structures inaccessible to local agency. He notes that 
these approaches see the gap between asserted aims and policy outcomes as a product of hidden, 
“dark matter-like” agency in its whole – not actually providing genuine understanding of the limits 
to liberal peace or giving emancipatory alternatives to it. Finally, Iñiguez de Heredia (2017, 3) 
points out that placing resistance on the international-local contention has only reified binaries and 
depoliticized the ‘locals’ by vaguely connecting their resistance agency in account of local culture, 
not in power relations along class, gender and race lines. She summarizes the main problems of this 
association as follows: 
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‘Who’ is the subject of resistance has been seen as an undefined ‘local’. ‘What’ is the object 
of resistance has been theorised as ‘the liberal peace’, whereas the extent to which these in-
terventions follow liberal values or locals reject liberal values is questionable. ‘How’ re-
sistance is undertaken has been seen as hidden and ungraspable without due explanation. 
This has resulted in a vague account of resistance, in a drift away from the original frame-
work of everyday resistance and in a limited politicisation of peace operations. (ibid., 8.) 
While this research adopts the lens of criticism of liberal peacebuilding, these important points of 
meta-criticism will be reflected in the analysis and the chosen methodological approach. Moreover, 
this research assumes the definition adopted by Iñiguez de Heredia (2017, 17): “[r]esistance is the 
pattern of acts undertaken by individuals or collectives in a subordinated position to mitigate or de-
ny the claims made by elites and the effects of domination, while advancing their own agenda”. 
Hence, resistance will not be examined in the context of hybridity or as a way towards hybrid peace 
in Bosnia, but rather as potentially having roots in the outcomes or failures of the liberal peace pro-
ject. As Iñiguez de Heredia (ibid., 3, 179-180) notes, after all, resistance is not aimed at the liberal 
nature of the interventions nor their externally imposed nature, but rather the recreation of an ex-
tractive and coercive order through reconstitution of state authority or the means of war. This entails 
that examining patterns in power relations and different types of context-specific acts should be in 
the focus. All in all, building her analysis of everyday resistance based on the ‘everyday frame-
work’ by James Scott and Michel de Certeau, Iñiguez de Heredia argues that resistance has been an 
undertheorized part of PCR, and therefore peacebuilding has been viewed as monolithic and over-
powering. 
While this research underlines Iñiguez de Heredia’s observations of the shortcoming of hybrid 
peace theorists in explaining local resistance, in one important aspect it diverges from her approach. 
The everyday framework utilized by Iñiguez de Heredia (ibid., 55, 183-184) places an emphasis on 
everyday forms of resistance in addition to more visible and explicit forms of resistance. These 
forms considered by her range from very mundane acts such as “insults”, “mockery”, “tax evasion” 
to more subversive form such as “redefining the ideals embedded in the peacebuilding discourse” or 
“using armed groups to protect oneself”. However, acknowledging the limited scope of this re-
search and that the topic, the Bosnian Spring protests, exhibits overt public and more or less orga-
nized forms of resistance, the hidden or infra-political forms of resistance are out of the scope. 
Hence, rather than examining everyday resistance, this research focuses on more overt and formally 
organized resistance emanating from the lack of everyday necessities – that is, experienced precon-
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ditions for life that one is willing to stand up and demand for. Noting Iñiguez de Heredia’s points of 
criticism, resistance will not be reduced to a part in the construction of hybrid peace, but focus will 
rather be on the subjects and practices of resistance. 
When it comes to resistance by elites, some constituent parts of liberal peace can be identified as the 
object of resistance more justifiably. As described in Chapter 4, the political elites of BiH have em-
braced certain aspects of liberal peace when it has not jeopardized their power base or benefits 
while resisting others. Thus, their opposition has taken more of a form of noncompliance or stagna-
tion rather than active resistance, as they have shown to be reluctant to progress forward from the 
constraints of the DPA by working towards constitutional reform or cooperating to build national 
unity (Richmond 2014, 26-27, Richmond & Franks 2009, 76-77). This type of resistance by politi-
cal elites, which can be considered as separate from the type connected with the everyday, has been 
researched by Keränen (2013), who examines different internal and external statebuilding trajecto-
ries in Bosnia, and Zanotti (2011), who focuses on resistance in the context of UN peace interven-
tions. As the issue of elite resistance has been well covered in the literature on liberal peace and 
Bosnia, here it is only be emphasised that the resistance by Bosnian political elites towards some 
aspects of liberal peace and embracement of others may be seen as one of the core reasons for the 
failures of liberal peace (See Richmond & Franks 2009; Kappler & Richmond 2014; Donais 2005). 
However, the primary focus of this research is on the resistance exhibited by the protesters and in 
doing so, Iñiguez de Heredia’s understanding of local resistance is followed.  
 
5.2. Critical Discourse Analysis, Research Material and Research Question 
Critical social science differs from other forms of social science in that it aims not only to de-
scribe societies and the systems (e.g. political systems), institutions and organizations which 
are a part of them but also to evaluate them in terms of ideas of what societies should be like 
(‘the good society’) if they are to cultivate the well-being of their members rather than un-
dermine it. (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, 78-79.) 
In line with the theory of criticism of liberal peacebuilding and the overt normative nature of PCR, 
this research can be categorized more generally as a part of critical social sciences.36 Critical social 
analysis can be disaggregated into two different constitutive forms of criticism: normative and ex-
                                                          
36 On the normative nature of PCR, see for example Pureza & Cravo (2007) and Atack (2009). 
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planatory criticism. Whereas the former “evaluates social realities against the standard of values 
taken as necessary to a ‘good society’”, the latter “seeks to explain why social realities are as they 
are, and how they are sustained or changed” (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, 79). This research re-
lates to both types of critical stances. With regard to the former, the utopian “good society”, against 
which a normative evaluation is to be made, is embedded in the ideals of liberal peace – that is, 
economic liberalization and development, human rights, civil society, democratization and rule of 
law.37 However, the research does not only stay at the level of normative critique but rather aims to 
uncover the underlying casualties of why the social reality in Bosnia and Herzegovina has reached 
its current state and how it is being sustained.38 
These forms of criticisms are closely connected with Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), which has 
a clear political dimension. CDA has a goal of shaking systems ridden with inequalities in power by 
uncovering their workings and effects, ultimately also altering the unequal distribution of different 
political, cultural and economic goods. Potent cultural objects, or texts, are the object of analysis, 
through which this goal is reached. (Kress 1996, 15.) The specific type of CDA utilized here is one 
developed by Norman Fairclough (1992, 62-64; 1989, 20-23). In this regard, also Fairclough’s nar-
row definition of discourse is followed: he uses the term to refer to spoken or written language use. 
Fairclough proposes to regard language use as a form of social practice, implying that discourse is a 
mode of action and representation. Second implication is that discourse and social structure are in a 
dialectical relation, as there also is such relation between social practices and social structures. In 
order to bring clarity to Fairclough’s idea, it is useful to look at the general levels of social reality 
that he is referring to. 
Fairclough & Fairclough (2012, 82) offer a disaggregation for analysing social life through three 
different levels of social reality. Firstly, social events are individual and concrete instances of, for 
instance, people acting, behaving in different ways or things happening. Secondly, social practices 
offer a higher analytical level: they are durable and somewhat stable ways of being associated with 
particular identities and ways of representing. Practices include genres as ways of acting, discourses 
as ways of representing and styles as ways of being. Thirdly, the highest and most abstract level of 
                                                          
37 See Chapter 3.1 above. 
38 Acknowledging my subject position as a researcher, I can only note that this choice is a personal preference: I see that 
the amount of research literature emphasising normative criticism, particularly with regard to liberal peace, is very suf-
ficient. Hence, as oppose to creating another purely normative criticism, I rather wish to provide a deeper understanding 
of the causalities behind the situation. While this research does not focus on giving policy advice, only by reaching a 
sufficient level of knowledge of oppressive social structures, meaningful and impactful social change can be achieved 
(See Fairclough 1989, 4). 
 
  
43 
 
analysis are social structures, which are structures, systems and mechanisms, such as capitalism, 
that are often seen as the basis for explaining events and practices. It can be understood that struc-
tures may shape practices directly, practices may shape events, but structures cannot shape events in 
a similar manner – this simplification does not, naturally, capture the complex interaction between 
these levels but gives nevertheless a rough guidance to understand them better. Fairclough (1992, 
65-67) argues further that a discourse, as a political practice, “establishes, sustains and changes 
power relations and the collective entities (classes, blocs, communities, groups) between which 
power relations obtain”. In this regard, there are power relations behind discourse and power is en-
acted and exercised in discourse. What this means, is that discourse is a site of power struggles, 
where power, itself, is at stake. (Fairclough 1989, 73-74.)  
As power relations are an integral part of the definition of resistance adopted by this research, CDA 
may be seen as a highly suitable methodological tool for conducting analysis on the Bosnian Spring 
protests. More generally, critical social sciences may also support the fight against oppressive social 
structures. As Fairclough (1989, 4) notes, a critical consciousness of domination and its forms is a 
condition for the effectiveness of resistance and ultimately the realization of change. Here it is nec-
essary to note my subject position as a person who has for many years actively travelled to Bosnia 
to study or to work as part of the international community in the country. In my personal capacity, I 
explicitly and openly support the social struggle towards a more equal, peaceful and prosperous so-
ciety in BiH. In line with the normative nature of PCR, assuming such open and transparent stance 
can be seen as a better practice than carrying an illusory mask of “neutrality” or “objectivity”.39 
Following Fairclough’s (2003, 205; 1992, 231-234) general approach, the analysis involves three 
different yet in practice overlapping facets: the analysis of discourse practices, texts and social prac-
tice that the discourse belongs to. Discourse practice includes three dimensions with corresponding 
analytical distinctions: text production (‘interdiscursivity’ and ‘manifest intertextuality’), text distri-
bution (‘intertextual chains’) and text consumption (‘coherence’). In the analysis, also social and 
institutional aspects (‘conditions of discourse practice’) should be taken into account. At the text-
level, the relational analysis approach of Fairclough, focuses on semantic, grammatical, vocabulary 
and/or phonological relations. This level of analysis is descriptive in its nature and acts as a link and 
justification for the interpretations presented at the level of discourse practices. The analysis of so-
cial practices is similarly interpretative in its nature. Social practices can be seen to include the fol-
lowing different but often interconnected or overlapping elements: activities, subjects and their so-
                                                          
39 As an example, Fairclough proclaims his political alignment and position as a researcher openly in Language and 
Power (1989, 5). 
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cial relations, instruments, objects, time and place, forms of consciousness, values and discourse. 
Fairclough’s CDA, in its core, is the analysis of the dialectic relationship between discourse and the 
other elements of social practice listed above. 
The primary research material of this research is compiled on a blog titled Bosnia-Herzegovina Pro-
test Files.40 According to its own description, “[the blog] is an initiative by an open network of ac-
tivists and academics collecting and translating texts being produced by BiH citizens during the 
‘Bosnian Spring’”. The blog consists of statements, declarations, demands, minutes from meetings, 
news reports, videos, opinion pieces and commentaries as well as other types of documents, most 
translated from Bosnian to English by the authors – at times under pseudonyms and at times named. 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files n.d.) As its proclaimed political alignment, the blog states:  
We are motivated and inspired by the initiative and creativity of those protesting on the 
streets in Bosnia and nascent attempts at practicing direct democracy. We believe that the 
words of ordinary people at moments of revolutionary change and upheaval are important 
and should be part of the conversation. They are also a refreshing antidote [to] the national-
ist fear-mongering, political spin and ‘expert opinion’ about current events in the region. 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files n.d.) 
The document translations available on the blog site serve as the primary material of the research, 
depicting the point of view of the protesters themselves.41 As the research data is relatively diverse, 
an initial classification, prioritization and reduction was conducted. The original material consisted 
of 110 documents of different lengths and types. These documents were numbered and disaggregat-
ed into six different categories: 1) meta, or material produced by the administrators of the blog; 2) 
material produced directly by the plena, including lists of demands, proclamations, social media 
commentary and press releases; 3) responses by non-BiH actors; 4) responses by BiH actors; and 5) 
commentary and opinions published on the media. As from the perspective of the research objective 
the experiences and voice of the protesters can be considered the most interesting, the material pro-
duced by the plena, a total of 33 documents, were chosen as the final material. These documents 
were further grouped by the location of the plenum and notes were taken after each reading of the 
material as the discourses were identified from the text. After that, the text was coded further by 
                                                          
40 https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/ 
41 As language is at the focus of CDA, it is important to note and acknowledge the power of the translator over shaping 
discourses. As I am not a speaker of Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian (BSC), this is an inescapable limitation that the research 
faces. However, when presenting direct quotes, in line with good scientific practice, the name or pseudonym of the 
translator will always be proclaimed if available. 
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discourse in an in-depth reading. Documents belonging to the meta-category were also used for 
providing background information to support and contextualize the analysis. 
The material included in the blog is analysed in order to answer to the following research question, 
which has been partly derived from the theoretical framework of this research: 
How is the resistance manifested in the Bosnian Spring protests connected to the failures of 
liberal peacebuilding seen during the peace process of Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
Following the criticism towards hybridity theorists, the analytical framework is built around the 
questions of ‘who’, ‘what’ and ‘how’ posed by Iñiguez de Heredia (2017). More specifically, these 
sub-questions are: 
1. Who are the subjects of resistance? 
2. What are the objects of resistance? 
3. How is the resistance undertaken? 
These questions are prioritized in the CDA-approach, forming through them the necessary under-
standing for the first component of the research question (“...resistance manifested in the Bosnian 
Spring protests…”). The second component (“...failures of liberal peacebuilding seen during the 
peace process of Bosnia and Herzegovina…”) has been elaborated upon earlier in Chapter 4. Hence, 
these components are ultimately brought together, and the research question is answered – or fol-
lowing Fairclough’s approach to CDA, the identified discourses are connected with the wider social 
practices. A textual analysis provides the necessary justification to the interpretations presented at 
the level of discourse practices. At the end, the findings of the analysis are compiled in a synthesis 
to facilitate discussion (Chapter 7). The discussion includes a critical evaluation of the validity, reli-
ability and quality of the results. While the theoretical discussions typically tend to speak past the 
local, through the analysis of the material, the voice of the protesters is given the centre of the stage. 
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6. Results: Hungry in Three Different Languages42 
6.1. In the Name of the Citizens 
The question of identity is answered by the protesters of the Bosnian Spring in a manifestly popu-
listic manner, building their common identity as an obverse to the current political establishment. 
Hence, a populistic we the people-discourse can be identified from the research material. This dis-
course is greatly in line with the aspirations of the protesters to bypass the political machinery, 
deemed inefficient and corrupt, through resorting to means of direct democracy. The protesters are 
most commonly identified simply as “the people”, “citizens” or “workers”, and what they aim for is 
not only seen to represent something valuable to the protesters or the plena, but also “for the society 
as a whole”.43 Their current position is reflected in references to themselves as “oppressed work-
ers”, “ordinary citizens” and “disempowered citizens” or in their requests towards other peers as 
“fellow sufferers”.44 This type of argumentation that depicts the protesters as the subordinate mass-
es is widely present in the material and demonstrative of the identified populistic discourse. 
Throughout the material there are a number of references to more specific groups under the abstract 
“people” or “citizens” umbrella term. At times, a disaggregation of “men and women” is added to 
specify the gender inclusiveness of the protesters’ identity.45 In Sarajevo Canton, a petition is signed 
by “intellectuals, advocates of/for human rights, cultural workers, journalists, [and] citizens of Sara-
jevo”, reflecting the support of many highly educated to the plena.46 The protests also seemed to 
gather support not only from those in Bosnia but also from the large Bosnian diaspora and people 
from nearby ex-Yugoslav republics where smaller solidarity protests were organized. However, for 
                                                          
42 The ethno-nationalist political framework was commented by the protesters in a creative and ingenious way: a plac-
ard carried by protesters in Zenica read ‘‘Gladni smo na tri jezika’’ (‘‘We are hungry in three languages”) (Kurtović & 
Hromadzic 2017, 280-281). 
43 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014a). Declaration of Sarajevo Protestors #1; Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files 
(2014d). 2nd Declaration of Sarajevo Citizens’ Plenum (Sarajevo #4); Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014e). Sara-
jevans Invited to First Meeting of Citizens’ Plenum; Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014f). The First Plenum of the 
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sake of convenience and due to lack of representative and sufficient data, these groups have been 
delimited from the research scope. When it comes to active participants within Bosnia, for instance 
in Brčko, the attendees of a plenum meeting are described as “the oppressed workers of Tesla, Bi-
mex, Velma, unemployed professionals, students, workers and tradespeople without a job, business 
owners, and even children”.47 Consequently, the dominating description of the protesters’ identity 
appears to be the abstract concept of “the people” or “citizens”. However, the role of the working 
class arises as an equally significant element in the collective identity of the movement. 
Particularly at its roots in the industrial city of Tuzla, but also in other locations, the protests and 
plena are, indeed, portrayed as a workers’ movement. This is evident already in the title of the first 
declaration, which specifically distinguishes workers as its own central group: “Tuzla’s Declaration 
of Citizens and Workers”.48 Indeed, the declarations, statements and demands often include use of 
language which transmits intertextual impressions traditionally associated with the workers’ move-
ment or the country’s socialist past. This is seen especially in the beginning and opening phrases of 
the texts. For instance, the Sarajevo Plenum starts its first declaration with the capitalized words: 
“IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE ON THE STREETS OF SARAJEVO”, and ends a later press 
release: “For a society based on solidarity and social justice”.49 Furthermore, an allusion towards 
the days of Yugoslavia and workers’ self-organization is seen in the beginning phrase of Tuzla Ple-
num’s first declaration: “Today in Tuzla a new future is being created!”.50 Calls for solidarity be-
tween citizens and workers as well as plena from different cities are also common, bearing resem-
blance to the socialist ideology. Ultimately, it seems that the nature of the protests and plena can be 
best described as partly a workers’ movement, building on the socialist-era workers’ tradition, and 
partly a populist or civic movement, claiming legitimacy also beyond the working class. 
The mandate to represent “the people” as a whole, is derived by the movement through the argu-
ment that direct democracy is the only possible way to accurately capture the people’s will: 
A plenum is the real, and the only, democracy. [...] Everybody stands behind the declarations, 
because they are the words of us all and the demands of us all. All other modes of activity to-
wards the institutions of state power are a continuation of corruption, party-political thievery, 
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and the pursuit of personal benefit and enrichment at the expense of a robbed people. (Bos-
nia-Herzegovina Protest Files 2014p, added by pseudonym “bakercatherine”) 
In the above quotation, a scholar affiliated with the protests and the Tuzla Plenum describes what a 
plenum is. The current approach to democracy, as it is being practiced in BiH, shows as fake, pre-
tentious and elitist as compared to the “real” democracy of the plena. While a debate and discussion 
precede voting at the plena, what the plenum ultimately decides is approved not only by its partici-
pants, but all citizens, leaving no room to hesitation or questioning of its decisions. Accordingly, the 
work of the plenum is described as happening “for the good of us all” by the Tuzla Plenum.51 
Throughout the research material, if a single document has not been prepared collectively by a ple-
num, the authors are careful to voice their position and role to ensure that their views are not con-
fused with the decisions of the plena – or the people’s will. This is the case, for instance, if the au-
thor represents a temporary and informal administrative party, acting for a purpose such as conven-
ing a meeting.52 This shows that the neutrality and representativeness of the plenum as a forum for 
democratic decision-making is protected and held to the utmost value. 
Single-handedly, all other means to pursue decision-making are seen as inherently undemocratic as 
they only contribute to maintaining the unwanted status quo and supporting the corrupt political 
elites. Hence, the plena are depicted as an imperative, as there is no third way to capture “the real” 
will of the people. For instance, in Sarajevo, the plenum is described “as an authentic and most le-
gitimate form of citizens’ democracy”.53 The significance and representational effectiveness of the 
plena as a form of direct democracy are highlighted even when turnouts do not seem to be as high 
as expected. This is seen in Brčko, where a plenum attracted “less than 50 people”, but it is never-
theless noted that “behind every person present are more than 250 unemployed, given all those reg-
istered with the unemployment bureau”.54  While the number of attendees did vary from city to city, 
with many meetings drawing in attendees by hundreds, regardless of the actual number of repre-
sentatives of “the people” present at the plena, the means were seen to justify the protesters’ claims 
towards representation. The “people-versus-elite” dichotomy and solidarity argumentation, on the 
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other hand, served to strengthen the claims and to build a feeling of community and coherence amid 
the protesters, as the representatives of the people and, particularly, the working class. 
 
6.2. Against the Establishment 
A broad anti-establishment-discourse can be identified from the research material, shedding light on 
the object of the resistance by the protesters. The abstract “establishment” in this case refers to po-
litical parties, elites and governments but is connected more generally to anyone associated with the 
state power, including the law enforcement. This discourse can be seen as a wider umbrella dis-
course, covering the following sub-discourses: administrative and political inertia, political parties 
and elites and neoliberalism. Identifying these objects of resistance is particularly important, as the 
identity of the protesters is constructed largely on the foundation of the described people-versus-
elite dichotomy. In this dichotomy, the protesters, or “the people”, are seen as the weaker party, op-
pressed by the political elites, parties and governments. Indeed, political elites, parties and govern-
ments, are the most concrete objects of resistance of the protesters. Previous and current govern-
ments are described as negligent, irresponsible and corrupt.55 The ruling elite is also seen as highly 
corrupt.56 What is taking place by the establishment, is described as “larceny of the society”.57 
However, direct democracy is presented as a means to re-empower the people and show that they 
carry the “true power”.  
The divide between the citizens and the political parties and elites is pronounced in the material. It 
is described that the plena demonstrate how “the citizens take their job more seriously than the poli-
ticians do”, and that those in power “represent people but don’t know how to be people”.58 Reflec-
tive of the divide, an interim group announcing the first meeting of the Brčko Plenum makes an 
emotionally charged plea: 
This is our space, you have yours in your parties. Behind us stand no parties or organiza-
tions. [...] LET’S SHOW THOSE WHO HAVE SHAMELESSLY CHEATED US FOR YEARS 
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THAT WE ARE NOT INCAPABLE AND THAT WE CAN MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT OUR 
LIVES OURSELVES. (Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files 2014ad, added by pseudonym 
“kolekili”.) 
Consequently, the protesters depict themselves as independent and apolitical – in the conventional 
party-political understanding of the word “political”. However, this is where different understand-
ings can be noted. Whereas the group calling for the Brčko Plenum outright declares: “[...] all wel-
come EXCEPT MEMBERS OF POLITICAL PARTIES!!”, another person affiliated with the Tuzla 
Plenum comments that politicians can attend and that the ideas and demands of political parties can 
be expressed at the plenums. However, it is clarified that these ideas and demands cannot take their 
official form and that politicians carry only one vote as anyone else.59 Hence, the plena are faced 
with the challenging question of whether the politicians’ party-political background, deemed cor-
rupt, outweighs their rights as individual citizens to take part in democratic decision-making. While 
the anti-party-political stance is prevalent, this question is clearly a difficult one to answer, particu-
larly at an early phase of the development of something seen as a new political innovation. In the 
end, distancing completely from the conventional political structures and organizations remains as 
the proclaimed position of the movement, yet not an unambiguous and easy choice. 
In addition to displaying resistance towards parties and elites, the protesters also raised up the issue 
of administrative and political inertia. This refers directly to the inefficient combination of incom-
patible political interests of the three main ethno-nationalist parties and the complex political struc-
ture set in place in the early statebuilding years as the heritage of the DPA. One of the organizers of 
the Tuzla Plenum describes that the sizable state machinery “reinforced by nationalism, corruption, 
nepotism and opportunism” presents a threat to the realization of the protesters’ demands due to its 
tendency to resist all changes.60 The incompetence of the political parties to agree on issues which 
are vital to the everyday lives of the citizens is one of the core justifications for the protest move-
ment’s existence. However, it is not just the parties and the government, which require complete 
reform, but also the administration and state structure.61 Also in this sense, the plena are seen by the 
protesters as a more efficient means of political decision-making than the conventional parliaments 
and assemblies of BiH, reinforcing the justification for resorting to them. As the apolitical nature of 
the plena is at least seemingly guaranteed, there is no risk that similar inertia due to incompatibility 
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of interests would affect them. After all, a decision made by a plenum is seen as the ultimate peo-
ple’s will, which is approved by all. 
The third sub-discourse, which is identifiable from the research material, concerns resisting neolib-
eralism. Given that socio-economic issues are at the heart of the protests, the ideology driving the 
political elites and causing the socio-economic distress is criticized heavily and resisted by the pro-
testers. Resistance of the privatization of public resources is a key point, which is shared by the ple-
na across the country.62 Several companies are named where the privatization process was deemed 
as illegal or failed, or where the companies were even deliberately “destroyed”. It is made clear that 
the political parties, elites and governments are the ones to be held accountable for this. Neverthe-
less, it is often noted that the new owners of the privatized companies or anyone profiting from the 
unjust process should be held accountable as well. In this sense, the new owners are seen as crimi-
nals whose actions have been left deliberately ignored by the establishment. Surprisingly, the con-
nection of political elites or parties as ones partaking and benefiting directly from the privatizations 
is not explicitly established. In addition to the privatizations, it is mentioned that the whole econom-
ic model of Bosnia “favours the rich” and is therefore unjust, and that the related “grotesque” finan-
cial arrangements have “killed all hope of social justice and prosperity of [the] society”.63 Hence, 
the choices guiding the privatization of public resources have not been transparent, just and made to 
the best interest of the citizens. 
Legitimization for the physical violence and injuries as well as the damage to property done by the 
protesters is derived from the anti-establishment umbrella discourse. One of the main arguments 
used for this is a comparison between the short and long-term periods: it is argued that the damage 
caused by the protesters is a direct result of the actions of those holding the power and is little com-
pared to the experienced injustices of the previous two decades. The protesters assume an apologet-
ic stance yet see the violence as an imperative: facing mistreatment by the political elites and au-
thorities, the protesters had no choice but to choose violence.64 Hence, pressure had been building 
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up since the end of the war and finally a tipping point had been reached. The final straw appeared to 
be the violence directed towards the initially peaceful protests by the law enforcement in Tuzla, 
which caused the chain reaction of solidarity-protests to begin. In this way, violence towards the 
protesters acted as a fuel to the protests initially, while when the change to the plenum-format hap-
pened, the protesters denounce themselves from its use. Repression by the law enforcement contin-
ued, nevertheless. 
There is no party or organisation behind us whatsoever. We know best that behind us there 
are only many years of humiliation, hunger, helplessness and hopelessness on all of our parts. 
And so we say NO to political brokering! There are no deals behind closed doors, no chosen 
ones. Only a plenum where citizens, men and women, will make agreements together about 
how to solve the problems we all face. Let no-one take our civic revolt away from us! (Bosnia-
Herzegovina Protest Files 2014e, added by pseudonym “kolekili”) 
The anti-establishment discourse is further strengthened by claims that the parties, elites and gov-
ernments – which the movement distances itself from – are trying to intentionally manipulate the 
events to their best, as the above quotation suggests. The ongoing “deals behind closed doors” are 
reflective of the networks of secretive clientelism that the protesters also denounce themselves 
from. The manipulation, which presents a risk to the movement’s existence, is claimed to be done 
also by the media, which has been harnessed to serve the interests of the political establishment.65 
The organizers of Sarajevo Plenum ask the citizens of Sarajevo to refrain from direct contact and 
dialogue with the government, “in order to prevent political brokerage”, that is, the unity of the pro-
testers being compromised.66 Arrests of and legal actions against the demonstrators made in the 
course of the protests are described as a “witch hunt of people”.67 The claims of manipulation are 
summarized well in a petition to support the Sarajevo Plenum: 
It is necessary to suppress by any means all free expression of thought and demands of the cit-
izens. It is necessary to return the citizenry into the discipline of collective nationalist fear. It 
is necessary to buy rubber bullets, and to proclaim dissatisfied citizens vandals and terrorists. 
It is necessary is [sic] for the six leaders to be front page news again and everything will be 
back to normal. This shall no longer pass. (Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files 2014l, added be 
Margareta Kern).  
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The manipulation described above further emphasizes the asymmetrical power relation between the 
establishment and the citizens, even to an Orwellian extent. However, what is particularly important 
to note, is the “discipline of collective nationalist fear”, which is seen as the prevalent status quo in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The protesters clearly recognize the risk that may follow with initiating 
such wide scale political actions: the protests may be discredited and attempted to dissolve by the 
establishment by spreading misinformation or framing them in the ethno-nationalist mould. This 
would effectively translate into a return to the status quo. The possibility of such cases or actual at-
tempts to divide the protesters are mentioned several times in the research material.68 An example 
of this is given by the Brčko Plenum: 
We are aware of the current political and media situation in Brčko and across Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, but we will not fall for the usual and already seen mechanism of manipulation 
such as ‘divide and rule’. We will not let anyone rob us of our citizen’s [sic] uprising. (Bos-
nia-Herzegovina Protest Files 2014af, added by Margareta Kern.)  
It is notable that in the research material the issue of ethnicity is discussed very carefully, or it is 
completely avoided. This may be explained by the protesters trying to avoid becoming victim of the 
“divide and rule”-tactics mentioned above. From this perspective, their goal of portraying them-
selves as apolitical is strategically vital – even the slightest unwanted connection to the political 
parties could cause the movement to fall apart fast. Hence, acting and resorting to the plena is seen 
even more as an imperative, as due to the asymmetric power relations the protesters voices would 
otherwise never be heard. In this way, the actual manipulation or risk of manipulation further en-
trenches the people-versus-elite dichotomy between the protesters and the establishment, acting as 
yet another reason for the movement to distance itself from conventional means of democratic deci-
sion-making or political organization. 
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6.3. Demanding Social Justice for All 
In terms of employed means of resistance, the plena stand in contrast to the street protests. Whereas 
on the streets the employed means were physical, such as mass demonstrations, “warning walks”69, 
blocking traffic and attacking property or the law enforcement, the plena showed a completely dif-
ferent side as they denounced violence. At the core were direct democracy and setting demands to 
the decision-makers, the key demand being a general call for social justice. This demand for social 
justice can be seen to form another umbrella discourse, which covers four more specific discourses 
depicting how a socially just society would be achieved: Robin Hood-discourse, meritocracy-
discourse, reversing neoliberalism-discourse and ending impunity-discourse. For the purpose of this 
research, the demands and the discourses mentioned above are more interesting than the physical 
means of resistance. In addition to the discourses or the general shared pattern between the plena 
that can be identified from the research material, a variety of localized demands can be distin-
guished as its own category. These include such context-specific demands as opening a public 
kitchen for the poor in Bugojno, forming a committee to normalize the status of the city of Mostar, 
finalizing construction of a veteran’s building in Bihac, revising the budget of a dog shelter in Pri-
jedor or providing students with free transportation to school in Zavidovići.70 Similar to the physical 
means of resistance, these ungeneralizable demands are not the main priority of the analysis.  
The so-called Robin Hood-discourse refers to the repeating demand of the protesters to level the 
socio-economic and political playing field by taking away from the establishment and giving back 
to the citizens and general public. An example of this discourse is visible in the Sarajevo protesters’ 
demand to sell the government’s new car pool and re-invest the funds into developing factories that 
have gone bankrupt. In the same list of demands, the protesters also call for lowering of politicians’ 
salaries and state that the damage caused by the protests should be covered directly from the reve-
nue intended for compensation to government representative.71 In a similar manner, towards the fi-
nal days of the movement before its dissolution, the Sarajevo Plenum demands for the funding of 
political parties to be redirected to provide assistance to people and communities affected by the 
subsequent widespread floods.72 The Tuzla Plenum, on the other hand, calls for an equalization of 
                                                          
69 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014t). Tuzla Citizens’ Plenum Calls for ‘Warning Walk’, Calling for Public Re-
nunciation of ‘Golden Parachutes’. 
70 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014ag). Second Bugjno Citizens’ Plenum: Declaration; Bosnia-Herzegovina Pro-
test Files (2014ac). Demands of the Citizens Plenum of Mostar; Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014aa). Bihac Citi-
zens’ Demands (Bihac #1); Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014z). Prijedor Citizens’ Demands (Prijedor #1); Bos-
nia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014ah). Demands of the Citizens of Zavidovići, February 11, 2014. 
71 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014b). Protestor Demands from Sarajevo (#2).  
72 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014m). Demands of the 13th Plenum of Citizens of Sarajevo.  
  
55 
 
the salaries of government representatives and workers in the public and private sectors, and an 
elimination of “irrational and unjustified forms” of compensation to them, including the so-called 
golden parachute or white bread.73 74 Similar demands are also presented in Zenica, Bihac, Mostar, 
Bugojno and Zavidovici, making the Robin Hood-discourse one of the most frequent in the research 
material.75 
Another common discourse is the demand for governments consisting of “experts” without political 
affiliation, or the meritocracy-discourse. The protesters show high trust in the solution that such ex-
pert-led governments could offer, giving another signal of their high distrust of conventional party 
politics and current governments in BiH. The identity of the experts is clarified as “professionals 
with relevant backgrounds, who through their work and achievements have proven themselves to be 
professional and successful individuals with moral integrity”.76 They are also described as “non-
political”, “non-partisan”, “uncompromised”, and as citizens “without a history in politics”.77 The 
reason for demanding this solution, according to the Sarajevo Plenum, is the “negligence and irre-
sponsible work of the previous government”. The selection process of the experts is clarified further 
by the Plenum: 
The Plenum […] insists that the composition of the Government be determined through an 
open process, to enable the public to view the biographies of the proposed candidates. The se-
lection must be based exclusively on the professional capacity and knowledge of the candi-
dates. The influence of political parties during the selection of candidates must be eliminated. 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files 2014j, added by pseudonym “Zora Kostadinova”) 
In this regard, the role of the public, or the plena as representing the public, is seen as an unbiased 
watchdog. This safeguard mechanism is referred to often in the research material, emphasising the 
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protesters trust in the people’s will.78 As the above quotation mentions, the selection process should 
be protected from any influence by political parties, giving another signal of the protesters’ com-
plete distrust towards them. Interestingly, while the role of international actors is discussed only on 
a few occasions, when they are mentioned, they are placed in the same category as the neutral ex-
perts. For instance, the help of foreign auditors is requested to audit the work of public enterprises 
and institutions in Bugojno, and the OSCE is invited to act as an independent observer to the Tuzla 
Plenum’s meetings with the cantonal government.79 
The third identified discourse reflects the protesters’ wish to remedy the negative socio-economic 
developments and to reverse neoliberalism, cancelling the already implemented privatizations and 
bringing those who have illegally benefitted from them to justice. In Sarajevo, an audit is demanded 
from the Cantonal Privatization Agency, for instance, for the privatizations of “Feroelektro, Holiday 
Inn, Sarabon, Zora, Kljuc, and all other enterprises where suspicious privatization has taken place, 
including enterprises of federal significance”.80 In Tuzla, a list of demands is set to the local gov-
ernment with regard to the privatization of Dita, Polihem, Gumara and Konjuh – the companies 
whose bankruptcy or economic difficulties sparked the initial workers’ demonstrations. The list in-
cludes ensuring secure health insurance and recognizing the seniority of employees; processing 
economic crimes and punishing those involved; returning illegally obtained property; and finally, 
annulling privatization agreements of the companies and preparing a revision of the privatizations.81  
Later, it is further specified by the Plenum’s Legal Team: 
[T]he future expert government of Tuzla Canton [should] establish an independent profes-
sional body to conduct an audit of the privatisation of public companies [...] and the commer-
cial operations of the companies after privatisation and to initiate legal proceedings [...] in 
accordance with the results of the completed audits. (Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files 
2014v, added by pseudonym “dbaplanb”.) 
In Zenica, the plenum requests the Cantonal government to “[r]esolve the status of all workers from 
companies destroyed in the process of privatization, whose rights were denied” and to ultimately 
                                                          
78 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014g). Citizens’ Demands to the Sarajevo Cantonal Assembly Adopted; Bosnia-
Herzegovina Protest Files (2014j). The Position of the Plenum: the Sarajevo Cantonal Assembly Must Pay Serious At-
tention to the Citizens’ Problems; Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014n). Tuzla’s Declaration of Citizens and 
Workers (Tuzla #1); Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014aa). Bihac Citizens’ Demands (Bihac #1).  
79 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014ag). Second Bugjno Citizens’ Plenum: Declaration; Bosnia-Herzegovina Pro-
test Files (2014w). Report from the 11th Session of the Tuzla Plenum of Citizens, 15 March 2014. 
80 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014g). Citizens’ Demands to the Sarajevo Cantonal Assembly Adopted; Bosnia-
Herzegovina Protest Files (2014h). These are the First Demands of Sarajevo Citizens to the Parliament of Sarajevo Can-
ton. 
81 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014n). Tuzla’s Declaration of Citizens and Workers (Tuzla #1).  
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revise the privatizations.82 Similar resolving of rights or status of workers from “destroyed” or 
“failed” companies is demanded also in Prijedor and Mostar.83 The Mostar Plenum also demands 
for the “removal of the statute of limitations of the prosecution of criminal acts of war profiteering 
and post-war privatization”.84 In Zavidovići, a municipality that has relied on and been connected 
closely with the wood industry, the bankruptcy privatization of the wood processing company IP 
Krivaja is emphasized in separate lists of demands. The Plenum states that in the course of the pri-
vatization a total of 172 employees were illegally fired and sets demands to remedy the experienced 
injustices.85 All the above examples reflect the central importance of socio-economic hardship as 
the foundation for the protest movement. 
The final discourse, which is highlighted by the protesters, is ending impunity. This discourse is 
partly overlapping with the demand of reversing neoliberalism in the sense that it also refers to ad-
judicating the persons illegally benefiting from privatizations. However, the discourse, which is 
highlighted particularly in Tuzla and Sarajevo, is also related to the demands for the law enforce-
ment to end their use of force towards the protesters and for their witnessed wrongdoings to be in-
vestigated.86 For instance, in Sarajevo the establishment of an “independent committee of experts” 
is requested for the purpose of conducting fact-finding and “verif[ying] the responsibility of the po-
lice services for excessive use of force and mistreatment of arrestees”.87 While calling for an end to 
the impunity of the law enforcement, the protesters also demand for the suspension of all criminal 
procedures against those who participated in the demonstrations.88 At the same time, the demand to 
end violence concerns both the law enforcement and the protesters: the plena are evidently trying to 
distance themselves from violent means which could bring the protest movement under unfavoura-
ble light.89 Demands to end impunity reflect the protesters’ negative view on the state of rule of law 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their understanding that political power or state power equals carte 
blanche at the face of law. 
                                                          
82 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014x). Zenica Protestors Deliver their Demands; Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest 
Files (2014y). The Government of Zenica-Doboj Canton (ZDC) Will Be Composed of Citizens. 
83 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014z). Prijedor Citizens’ Demands (Prijedor #1). Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest 
Files (2014ab). Mostar Citizens’ Demands (Mostar #1) 
84 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014ac). Demands of the Citizens Plenum of Mostar.  
85 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014ah). Demands of the Citizens of Zavidovići. 
86 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014g). Citizens’ Demands to the Sarajevo Cantonal Assembly Adopted; Bosnia-
Herzegovina Protest Files (2014i). Sarajevo Citizens’ Plenum Demands to sit at the Next Sarajevo Cantonal Assembly 
Session; Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014k); Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Sarajevo Canton Doing Every-
thing to Break the Revolt - Even at the Cost of Public Safety; Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014z). Prijedor Citi-
zens’ Demands (Prijedor #1). 
87 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014g). Citizens’ Demands to the Sarajevo Cantonal Assembly Adopted.  
88 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014w). Report from the 11th Session of the Tuzla Plenum of Citizens, 15 March 
2014.  
89 Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files (2014aa). Bihac Citizens’ Demands (Bihac #1). 
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In a similar manner as the varying localized demands, the common and shared discourses that are 
visible throughout the material are always shaped according to the local context. Hence, similar 
types of arguments are raised for reaching an ideal state of social justice around BiH, but with dif-
ferent angles and targets. Situating almost purely in FBiH, the plena raise criticism and demands 
that are mostly focused on local cantonal governments, rather than the relatively weak central gov-
ernment or the FBiH entity government. At the same time, the abstract concepts of “establishment” 
or “politics” are often addressed in a rather holistic manner, seeing anything related as undesirable 
or contaminated. In this way, the described corruption and misuse of power are also seen to pene-
trate all levels of governance – comprehensive reforms are required to provide a remedy and to cre-
ate a socially just order. The described discourses depict the vision envisaged by the plena for 
reaching this sought-after end state. 
  
  
59 
 
7. Synthesis of the Findings and Discussion 
 
Fig 4. Synthesis of the research findings 
The synthesis (Fig 4.) of the research findings shows the 2014 protest movement as partly a work-
ers’ movement, building on the socialist-era tradition, and partly a populist or civic movement, 
claiming legitimacy also beyond the working class. The movement constructed its proclaimed apo-
litical identity on the perceived and pronounced people-versus-elite dichotomy, positioning itself 
against the political establishment. The protesters’ collective identity was further reinforced through 
common calls for solidarity between the participants and plena across BiH. The protest movement 
focused its resistance particularly on political parties, elites and governments, administrative and 
political inertia and neoliberalism. The years of the neglect and wrongdoings as well as the deliber-
ate manipulation by the political establishment seeking to dissolve the movement further entrenched 
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the dichotomy, strengthening the protesters claims towards representation and collective identity. 
While also using different physical means, the movement undertook resistance primarily by resort-
ing to direct democracy and setting collectively approved demands. In addition to various localized 
demands, the recurring and most common demands included taking away unjustified financial bene-
fits from political party and government representatives and redistributing them to the society, re-
placing political governments with politically unaffiliated expert governments, reversing the failed 
privatization processes and ending the impunity of those illegally benefitting from them as well as 
representatives of state power guilty of violations against the protesters. 
Returning to the research question, the key aspects where liberal peacebuilding has experienced 
failures, as were derived from the local-turn criticism, can be easily reflected against the issues high-
lighted by the protesters. Lack of local ownership, inclusivity, legitimacy, efficiency and economic 
emancipation were noted as these aspects in Chapter 4. Looking firstly at the question of local own-
ership and inclusivity, the Bosnian Spring protests demonstrate in a very clear manner the common 
discontentment at the local level towards the high power position held by the political elites and the 
prevalent inequality. Acknowledging the elite-led nature of the peace process in BiH, this can be 
seen as an indication of the exclusion of the issues relevant to the local and the everyday from the 
peacebuilding agenda (see Richmond 2014; Richmond and Franks 2009). This observation is partic-
ularly present in the overt resistance towards political elites, parties and governments, who all were 
seen as self-serving figures (See Mukjić & Hulsey 2010; USAID 2017). The protesters demand to 
level the playing field, taking away from the establishment and giving back to the general public 
was one of the most common discourses in the research material. This Robin Hood-discourse re-
flects the experienced inequality, as the peace dividend, described by Richmond (2014), has stayed 
purely in elite possession. Notably, the findings did not highlight criticism towards the ownership of 
the peace process in terms of the international/local-dichotomy, but focus was rather on the asym-
metric ownership and power relations between the elites and the citizens within the framework of 
the non-inclusive process. 
Secondly, the rejection of conventional means of democratic decision-making and political organi-
zation by the protesters signals of a lack of legitimacy of the outcomes of the peacebuilding and 
statebuilding process. Their proclaimed apolitical stance can be read as another sign of distrust, as 
difficult or impossible reaching the complete political isolation may in the end be. Lacking legitima-
cy of the existing political parties to represent the citizens culminates in the meritocracy-discourse – 
in the idea that only neutral, professional and politically unaffiliated experts can guide the country 
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forward as it should be done. Along with the Robin Hood-discourse, this was another very common 
discourse visible in the research material. Thirdly, the heavy criticism towards the wide administra-
tive and political inertia is telling of the core inefficiencies of liberal peacebuilding and statebuild-
ing. The inertia can be traced to the complex state structure and the straight-jacket-like political her-
itage left by the DPA, which served as the entry point to the liberal peacebuilding process. While 
signalling about lack of legitimacy, the protesters’ choice to abandon the state machinery and form 
their own channels of democratic decision-making emphasizes also the evident inefficiency of the 
system. The incapability of liberal peacebuilding to guarantee adherence to rule of law by the repre-
sentatives of state power, on the other hand, is evidenced by the impunity-discourse. 
Finally, at the root of the protests were unarguably socio-economic issues and the lack of economic 
emancipation. The protesters set their priorities clear by raising criticism on the overemphasized 
questions of ethnicity and nationalism, sending a message that socio-economic issues are more ur-
gent and relevant to them at the level of everyday. This is reflective of the inability of liberal peace-
building to recognize difference and to identify and address the issues significant to the everyday 
(See Richmond 2014). The protesters were outspoken in their resistance towards neoliberalism, 
pointing to the entire economic system in Bosnia but more specifically the failed privatization pro-
cesses, the success of which had been demonstrably poor (see Pugh 2002). Privatizations were not 
only a key issue in the birthplace of the protests, Tuzla, or the capital Sarajevo, but they were as 
commonly highlighted in more rural areas. The central role of certain local companies and the high 
socio-economic dependency of smaller municipalities on them was visible in the research material. 
This applies, for instance, to the case of IP Krivaja in Zavidovići – smaller municipalities such as 
Zavidovići are highly affected in the case of a bankruptcy of such company vital to the local econo-
my. Zavidovići, Tuzla, Sarajevo and other stages of the Bosnian Spring demonstrate how such col-
lapse can create a fruitful ground for unrest. In the face of such immediate loss, waiting for the trick-
le-down cannot provide a solution to urgent socio-economic needs for those left outside the net-
works of patronage (See Roberts 2011; Pugh 2002). 
Connections between the proclaimed ideals – and the eventual failures – of liberal peace and the 
identified discourses are evident. At the root of the protesters’ criticism were exactly the same issues 
that liberal peacebuilding seeks to achieve: democracy, rule of law, civil society and human rights, 
and economic liberalization. The protesters showed a complete lack of trust towards the convention-
al democratic processes in the country, instead, isolating themselves from party politics and choos-
ing and creating their own means of democratic decision-making. At the same time, their opposition 
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towards perceived impunity of the representatives of state power pointed to the poor state of rule of 
law in the country. Their fear of manipulation and attempts to divide the movement evidenced the 
narrow space that exist for the civil society and the overpowering position of the ethno-nationalist 
political parties in BiH. Finally, as the core driver for the protests, socio-economic hardship and the 
failed privatizations directed the protesters’ attention towards the failed economic restructurings, 
raising demands to revert the privatization and return public ownership of the businesses. The ex-
ample of the Bosnian Spring protests reaffirms the conclusion of the critics of liberal peace that the 
ideal has merely led to illiberal and fragile outcomes (See Richmond 2011; Mac Ginty 2011). 
The findings are in line with the previous research on the topic, as social justice and socio-economic 
issues arose as the core demands of the protesters (See Murtagh 2016). They suggest that the low 
level of trust towards the political process and politicians, which was seen during the first ten-year 
period after the war, has not changed much in reality (See Søberg 2006). The observation on the 
protesters’ attempt to distance themselves from violent means is complemented by Sejfija & Fink-
Hafner’s (2016) remark that public condemnation towards the violence helped to transform the pro-
tests towards a more institutionalized form, that is, the plena. The research also noticed similar allu-
sions towards BiH’s socialist history and the Yugoslav tradition of workers’ self-management, as 
Kurtović and Hromadzic (2017) noted. As much of the previous research emphasised, the findings 
also suggested that the protesters distanced themselves from the ethno-nationalist political debate, 
setting socio-economic and biopolitical needs before nationalist divisions (See Kurtović & 
Hromadzic 2017; Kurtović 2015; Majstorović et al. 2015). Like Kurtović (2015) noted, the protest-
ers produced a critique of the patronage networks and central role of ethno-nationalism by raising 
socio-economic issues to the limelight (See Kurtović 2015). Within the theoretical framework of 
this research, this can be also read as a critique of the overemphasis of the significance of inter-
ethnic distrust at the level of everyday, setting the actual priorities of the citizens clear. The threat 
and risk of manipulation of the protests was also in accordance with the way political parties and 
elites aligned themselves against the movement, as described by previous research (See Sejfija & 
Fink-Hafner 2016; Kurtović & Hromadzic 2017; Murtagh 2016). 
While the results were much in compliance with previous research on the subject, the analysis also 
pointed out to a number of previously underemphasized issues, mainly, the lack of power relations 
as a part of the analysis. The findings painted a particularly overpowering portrait of the role of the 
political parties and elites in BiH, which manifested as a high distrust and an abandonment of all 
conventional means of democratic decision-making and party politics by the protesters. Anything 
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related to politics was seen as rotten, and for this reason, alternative means had to be sought. By 
forming the plena and setting demands, the protesters advanced their agenda, mitigating and deny-
ing claims made by elites and the effects of domination (See Iñiguez de Heredia 2017). While short-
lived, this way the plena acted to re-empower the protesters, who in their claims towards representa-
tion identified with the working class and the citizens of BiH. Verifying Iñiguez de Heredia’s (ibid.) 
argument, the resistance by them showed not to be aimed at the liberal nature of peacebuilding or its 
externally imposed nature, but the coercive order set by the state. In addition to making the power 
relations more visible, the analysis also provided a clearer disaggregation of how resistance was 
structured in this case: who the protesters claimed to represent, what did they resist and how did the 
undertake the resistance. In this way, the research reiterated the criticism towards the way hybridity 
theorists have approached resistance: forgetting power relations, mystifying agency and ultimately 
reifying binaries and depoliticizing the local (See Nadarajah and Rampton 2015; Chandler 2013; 
Iñiguez de Heredia 2017).  
The results can be seen to elucidate the dynamics between the civil society and the political elites in 
the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The plena were clear to denounce violence or alternatively 
downplay its effects and depict violent acts as something that the protesters were forced to commit. 
This change from fierce street protests to peaceful democratic decision-making and the decision of 
the protesters to distance themselves from violence, seemed to be explained partly by the risk of 
manipulation by the political establishment. For this reason, the movement appeared to also opt for 
an apolitical identity as their ideal. Hence, the protest movement tried to escape being labelled or 
framed politically and to avoid the elite domination, yet ultimately fell victim to it. It can be argued 
that a potential stumbling block for similar civil society movements that seek wide scale support 
and solidarity across ethno-national lines in Bosnia and Herzegovina is such risk of political manip-
ulation and framing. Repression by state authorities presents another risk: violence acted as a fuel to 
the protests initially, but as Stefanovski (2017) noticed, the violent repression by the law enforce-
ment eventually contributed to the movement’s demise. The “straight-jacket” of Dayton and the fol-
lowing domination of ethno-national parties with incompatible interests can be seen as a key failure 
of liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding in Bosnia. As a consequence, the room for civil society 
actors to influence societal developments and to act to bring upon positive change in the country is 
highly restricted.  
In a more general sense, the results suggested towards a potential link between socio-economic fac-
tors and political instability. Combined with an atmosphere of repression and a lack of effective 
  
64 
 
channels for citizens to voice their opinions and to influence democratic decision-making, lack of 
livelihood, social safety networks and services vital to everyday life appeared to be a significant de-
stabilizing factor. It seemed that when taken far enough, the lack of everyday necessities was 
enough to break the zero-sum perception and the influence of clientelism which acts to sedate the 
public to adhere to the status quo (See Mukjić & Hulsey 2010). A spark, or a triggering event such 
as a violent and oppressive reaction by the law enforcement was only needed, and a nationwide 
state of crisis was ignited. While the results were theoretically aligned with the criticism of liberal 
peacebuilding, they can be seen to share ground with research on the link between socio-economic 
factors, such as economic inequality or social mobility, and political (in)stability (See Baten & 
Mumme 2013; Boix 2008; Houle 2019). For instance, Houle (2019, 106) has discovered that coun-
tries with a low level of social mobility are more likely to experience unrest, such as anti-
government demonstrations, riots, revolutions, general strikes, guerrillas and political assassina-
tions. In addition to the socio-economic factors, the results of this research point out to other inter-
esting aspects whose influence on the incidence of unrest could be assessed further: for instance, 
distrust towards conventional democratic means of decision-making and political organization, poor 
state of rule of law or perceived impunity of state authorities.  
From the perspective of validity, the methodological approach and analysis managed to capture ex-
actly what it sought to capture. Nonetheless, from the perspective of reliability, some limitations or 
observations should be acknowledged. Firstly, the quantity of research material was relatively light 
and weighted towards the cities of Sarajevo and Tuzla. In this regard, a difficulty was the availabil-
ity of material in English, as incorporating B/S/C material could have provided a more balanced se-
lection also towards other cities and rural areas. However, Tuzla and Sarajevo were, indeed, central 
stages for the protests, and the analysis produced interesting findings, which were sufficient ac-
knowledging the limited scope of a master’s thesis. The findings of this research should still be un-
derstood as general connecting lines between the plena, and local variance between them should be 
acknowledged. Secondly, and as always, there may be a gap between what actors proclaim and 
what the reality is. This research is based solely on material produced by the protesters and not veri-
fied directly, for instance, through personal or third-party accounts. Nevertheless, as the research is 
concerned with the voice of the protesters – how they portray themselves and what issues they raise 
as important to themselves – the type of material was also suitable to its aims. Moreover, the find-
ings of this research were greatly in line with previous research on the subject, ultimately ensuring a 
sufficient level of reliability. 
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As a final observation, importantly, it should be noted that the protesters did not at any point direct 
their resistance towards the international community in Bosnia but specifically political parties, 
elites and governments. On the contrary, third-party international assistance, akin to the protesters’ 
neutral meritocratic ideal, was requested, for instance, for conducting the requested audits or moni-
toring meetings between the representatives of the plena and cantonal government officials. In this 
regard, the finger was not being pointed at the international community – yet the question is: could 
it have been? While the cemented power position of the ethno-nationalist political elites and parties 
has been at the heart of preventing positive developments in the country, the international commu-
nity has not been uninvolved. The paradox of local and international ownership, as Richmond & 
Franks (2009) noted, refers to the internationals’ wish to hand over ownership of the statebuilding 
process to local actors but to simultaneously ensure that their liberal agenda is being adhered (See 
Richmond and Franks 2009). Indeed, a handover has been happening slowly and the international 
community is not the same that it was in the early post-war years. The protesters were correct in 
emphasising the responsibility of the political parties and elites, acknowledging that there are more 
limitations to how the international community can influence the situation than there were earlier, 
as the erosion of the Bonn Powers shows. Nevertheless, going to the root of the problems, the inter-
national community was – and still is – a major driving force in the peacebuilding and statebuilding 
process of Bosnia, and in this way, as accountable as the political parties and elites for its outcomes.  
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8. Conclusions 
The purpose of this research was to give a comprehensive understanding of how Bosnia and Herze-
govina had come to such state that its people were willing to raise up on the barricades in 2014. The 
research juxtaposed criticism of liberal peacebuilding against a thorough analysis of the protest 
movement, mapping out their identity and claims towards representation, object of their resistance 
and their means of resistance. Connections between the failed ideals of liberal peacebuilding wit-
nessed along the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the resistance manifested during the 
Bosnian Spring protests were made visible and pinpointed, highlighting the observation of the lo-
cal-turn critics that liberal peace has only led to illiberal and fragile outcomes. 
Aligning with criticism of liberal peacebuilding, the research pieced together a portrait of the peace 
process in Bosnia and Herzegovina which has been characterized by stagnation, grey economy, cor-
ruption, clientelism, economic exploitation, an emphasized role of predatory elites and a dependen-
cy on a long-living international presence. While the poorly performing ethno-nationalist parties 
have dominated the legislatures, their success in repeatedly winning their seats has been contrasted 
by an overwhelming distrust towards them, prevalent among average Bosnians. At the same time, 
the importance of basic socio-economic issues for the everyday lives of Bosnians has been over-
looked parallel to a disproportionate emphasis of inter-ethnic distrust.  The Bosnian Spring protests 
fitted this narrative expectedly, as the protesters’ criticism of the status quo of ethno-nationalist par-
ties and elites sent out a message that hunger weights more than political fault lines. The links be-
tween the failures of liberal peacebuilding and the witnessed resistance were deemed evident, as at 
the root of the protesters’ criticism were the same issues that liberal peacebuilding seeks to achieve: 
democracy, rule of law, civil society, human rights and economic liberalization in the form of free-
market reform and development. 
The research provided a fresh and multidisciplinary perspective of Peace and Conflict Research to 
complement previous research on the Bosnian Spring protests. Acknowledging the variance be-
tween localized demands of different plena, it sought to identify the general connecting characteris-
tics between them. While the research joined the theoretical literature on criticism of liberal peace-
building, it also parted from its common understanding of resistance which was seen to ignore the 
central importance of power relations, to create a blurry account of agency, to reify binaries and to 
depoliticize the local. Accordingly, the overpowering role of the ethno-nationalist parties and politi-
cal elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina was highly visible in the results. Based on the example of the 
Bosnian Spring protest movement, the research suggested that the success of similar civil society 
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movements that seek wide scale support and solidarity across ethno-national lines in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is conditioned on them being able to escape domination by the political elites and to 
evade the risk of political manipulation and framing, which only aim to guarantee a return to the 
status quo beneficial to the central ethno-nationalist parties themselves. It was argued that the space 
for civil society actors to influence societal developments and to act to bring upon positive change 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina is highly restricted. 
In a more general sense, the results emphasized the link between socio-economic factors and politi-
cal instability, pointing out to interesting directions for further research. The research gave a gentle 
reminder of the importance of employment, social welfare, pension, standard of living and other 
socio-economic factors that form the foundation for everyday life. When this foundation crumbles, 
the results can be seen in uprisings such as the Bosnian Spring protests or, most recently, the Gilets 
Jaunes movement in France. There are no standard operating procedures to how such movement is 
formed and sustained – it may be spontaneous and become fuelled by repression by the law en-
forcement, as was the case in Bosnia, or it may form around central leading figures in a more coor-
dinated manner. However, in order to reach such critical mass that the Bosnian Spring protests 
managed to momentarily reach, it needs to be based on common and shared necessities that are ur-
gent to the everyday. Whether the movement can retain its momentum and eventually reach its pro-
claimed goals is always another story.  
In the years after the Bosnian Spring protests, only a few things have changed from the perspective 
of the international community, political elites and civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
EU-integration process of the country has progressed in small steps, as the bilateral SAA-agreement 
entered into force in 2015 and the country formally applied for EU-membership in 2016. Soon after 
the protests, the EU initially shifted its approach from political to economic, prioritizing economic 
reforms over constitutional reforms, such as implementing the Sejdić and Finci ruling. However, the 
EU’s 2018 strategy for Western Balkans lifted rule of law again higher on the list of priorities. 
Meanwhile, the centrifugal forces tearing the country apart have only intensified as the separatist 
ambitions of Serb-nationalist Milorad Dodik have reached a higher platform in the BiH Presidency, 
and the Croat-nationalist party HDZ’s claims of marginalization and calls for a third entity have 
simultaneously become louder and louder. The economy has not shown serious signs of recovery, 
and the emigration of the young and educated still remains a growing trend. At the time of writing 
this, the protest movement “Justice for David”, as a latest example of the citizens’ efforts to demand 
social justice and accountability from the state authorities, has retained its momentum for the tenth 
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month despite attempts by the RS law enforcement to supress the movement.90 As many of the 
problems underlined by the Bosnian Spring protest movement in 2014 have been left unaddressed, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a fertile ground for civil unrest. 
 
 
  
                                                          
90 The ”Justice for David” movement was formed around the death of the 21-year old David Dragicevic, whose father 
accuses the RS police of lying and covering-up his son’s murder. The EU Delegation (EUD) and EU Special Repre-
sentative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUSR) have commended the outcry against lack of rule of law and impunity that 
the movement has managed to raise, calling for due explanation for the way the RS authorities have handled the protests 
and commenting that the events in Banja Luka send an alarming signal of the state of rule of law in Bosnia and Herze-
govina. (Balkan Insight 2018; EUD/EUSR 2018.)  
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